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INTRODUCTION 
"Hey Chuck! You're on the school board. I need to ask you about 
which schools are the good ones here in D.C. We're in the market for a 
house. Can you recommend a good public school?" The question comes 
from a young colleague, a liberal Democrat who supports integration and 
affirmative action. His child is still less than a year old, and it strikes me as 
a little early to be worrying about elementary schools, but I'm not surprised. 
Today young urban professionals start worrying about where they will send 
their children to school well before their first child is conceived. Perhaps 
parents have always been concerned about their children's education, but 
my colleague knows the stakes are different now. He has read the New York 
Times story describing a rapidly growing industry of consultants with 
names like "Ivy Wise Kids" who will coach parents on how to prepare four-
and five-year-olds for preschool tests and interviews. I He is positioning his 
child in a competitive market, and his choices will determine that child's 
future (or at least his chances to get into Harvard or Yale). What parent 
wouldn't use every asset at his disposal to maximize his children's options? 
I answer with a list of four or five elementary schools that I assure him 
are as good as any private school in the city. All of them are located in 
white neighborhoods west of Rock Creek Park. I do not mention the school 
that my children attend. I know that theirs is not the school he envisions 
when he asks me about "good schools." For one thing, it's too black,2 but 
it's much more complicated than that. There are huge silences in this 
apparently casual, good-natured, informational conversation between 
colleagues. Not really silence, but things left unsaid, which I experience as 
my silence. I am thinking about what the good schools look like, about 
what the children at the good schools look like and who their parents are. 
I'm thinking about the not-so-good schools in the city-there are many 
more than four or five of these-about the terrible schools and the children 
1. Robert Worth, For $300 an Hour, Advice on Courting Elite Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2000, at B12. The article quotes Mark H. Sklarow, executive director of the Independent 
Educational Consultants Association, as saying, "'Parents generally have a very skewed 
perception of the private school world .... They're convinced that if they don't get into a good 
nursery school, they're never going to get into the right prep school, they won't get into Harvard, 
and their life is over.'" [d.; see also Marco R. della Cava, Parents and Preschool: Schmooze or 
Lose, USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2002, at 10 (discussing the competitive market for private school 
spots); Jane Gross, Right Schoolfor 4-Year Old? Find an Adviser, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,2003, at 
Al (describing the market for advisers). 
2. See D.C. PUB. SCH., MEMBERSHIP IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS BY 
SCHOOL, GRADE, RACE AND SEX 21 tbl. (2003), available at http://www.kI2.dc.us/dcps/ 
frontpagepdfs/membershipOct703_race.pdf (reporting that Shepherd Elementary School has a 
total of351 students, of whom 320 are black, 13 white, 13 Hispanic, and 5 Asian). 
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in those schools and their parents.3 I'm thinking about what caused these 
conditions. Part of me is resenting my colleague's question and judging his 
reason for asking, but I am a parent and I understand a parent's honorable 
motive. I do not speak of these things because there is an unspoken 
agreement that we will not speak of racism and its consequences when our 
friends, neighbors, or colleagues must make choices about the lives of their 
children. If I speak of the racism that has created these conditions, I will 
likely be heard to call my colleague racist. I would be misunderstood, and I 
do not want to offend. I tell myself that I just do not have the time or energy 
for this complicated conversation, but I feel guilt for my silence. I am 
participating in the taboo against the conversations that must be had. 
This article considers the subject of my silence, the relationship 
between the constitutional injury of racial segregation and the privatization 
of education. When I speak of privatization here I do not only mean the 
flight to private schools or the corporatization of school systems or the 
politics of school vouchers,4 although these are all symptoms of the larger 
problem I wish to explore. The larger problem is something I call the 
privatization of care and concern for and conversation about the education 
of our children. I believe that public policymakers and individual parents 
increasingly think and speak about children's right to equal educational 
opportunity as if that project were primarily about giving parents the 
"liberty" to be consumers in the education market on behalf of their own 
children. The decisions about how to educate our children (meaning the 
children in our nuclear family)-where we will school them, who their 
classmates will be, what curriculum they will be taught-are thought of as 
private, and part of our constitutionally protected liberty to raise our 
children as we see fit. 5 When my colleague asks about a good school for his 
son, he is not engaging me in a conversation about what school is best for 
his children and mine, much less for the poor black children who live in 
3. The D.C. Public School (DCPS) system's enrollment is 84.4% black and 4.6% white. D.C. 
Pub. Sch., Just the Facts, http://www.k12.dc.us/dcps/offices/factsl.html#4 (last visited Mar. 31, 
200S). Of the 108 elementary schools in the DCPS system, 24 schools have 100% black 
enrollment. See D.C. PUB. SCH., supra note 2, at S-26 tbl. The D.C. government website lists 27 
elementary schools where 7S% of students test at or above a basic level in reading and math. 
Significantly, of those 27 relatively high-performing schools, only 3 of the schools with 100% 
black enrollment made the list, while all II of the elementary schools enrolling more than fifteen 
white students are ranked. /d.; Wash. D.C. Educ. Ctr., Quick Report: Public Schools with 7S% 
Testing Basic & Above in Reading & Math, http://dcschoolsearch.dc.gov/schools/ 
report_results.asp?report_id= II (last visited Mar. 31, 200S). 
4. See generally SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS 
ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 221 (2004) ("[B]etween 1993 to 1999, the number of 
families choosing options other than a neighborhood public school, whether public, private, or 
home-schooling, increased by a third, with most of that increase coming from parents placing 
their children in public schools of choice-magnet or charter schools."); PETER W. COOKSON, JR., 
SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 17-37 (1994). 
S. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. SIO (192S). 
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D.C. When parents search for a good school for their children, they do not 
see the project as collective, as about how we will engage the political 
process as a community to determine what is best for all our children and 
see to it that they get it. 
How is this privatized view of education related to the segregation of 
urban schools? An obvious answer is that private schools have often been a 
haven for whites resisting school desegregation.6 But I want to explore a 
more complex story about this relationship. It is not the relatively 
straightforward story of Prince Edward County, a Virginia school district 
that closed all of its public schools from 1959 to 1964 and provided tuition 
grants to private white acadernies/ but the story's impact on poor black 
children is not entirely different. In the nation's capital, only 4.6% of the 
children attending public schools are white.8 By the time they reach their 
senior year in high school, less than 1 % of the graduating class is white.9 
More than 60% of D.C.'s public school students are eligible for free or 
reduced-price lunch.1O The race and class segregation within the District is 
even more extreme. The schools east of the Anacostia River in Wards 
Seven and Eight are more than 99% black. II More than 90% of the school 
district's white elementary students go to a few schools in the white 
neighborhoods west of Rock Creek Park and on Capitol Hill.12 
6. See Griffm v. County Sch. Bd., 377 u.s. 218, 232-34 (1964) (affmning the district court's 
power to order the school board to cease tuition grants to white students enrolling in private 
academies and to order reopening of public schools that had been closed in response to a 
desegregation order); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 754-55 (M.D. Ala. 
1964) (three-judge court) (ordering state officials to refrain from interfering with the enforcement 
of court-ordered desegregation); Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 
1961) (three-judge court) (fmding unconstitutional a Louisiana statute allowing public schools 
under desegregation orders to convert to private schools and operate as segregated institutions 
using state tuition grants), ajJ'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962). 
7. See Griffin, 377 U.S. at 223-24. 
8. See supra note 3. 
9. There were only 122 white twelfth-grade students in the entire D.C. system in 2003, out of 
a total of 2484 twelfth graders. See D.C. PUB. SCH., supra note 2. 
10. NAT'L CTR. FOR EoUC. STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 100 LARGEST PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2001-02, at 28 tbl.8 
(2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003353.pdf. 
11. See D.C. PUB. SCH., supra note 2. The 2000 Census showed the District's overall resident 
population to be about 60% black and 30% white. Census Bureau, D.C. QuickFacts, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/lI000.html(last visited Mar. 31, 2005). Yet in 2000-2001, 
the city's schools were 85% black and just 5% white. D.C. PUB. SCH., supra note 2. 
12. See D.C. PUB. SCH., supra note 2. The extreme racial segregation in the D.C. public 
schools is not unique. According to research by Gary Orfield and others, the nation is currently 
experiencing a return to segregated schools. "Although whites make up two-thirds of U.S. 
students in 200 I, the typical white student attends a school where four out of five children (79%) 
are white," while typical "Black and Latino students attend schools where two-thirds of the 
students are Black and Latino and most students are from their own group." GARY ORFIELD & 
CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM 
OR PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? 16-17 (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/ 
research/reseg04Ibrown50. pdf. 
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Just over fifty years ago Washington, D.C. schools were segregated by 
law.13 In 1967, a federal court found that while the District had 
desegregated its schools; it had maintained segregated classrooms within its 
schools through a system of tracking students that perpetuated the 
inequalities of the old de jure system. 14 But today's segregation is not the 
product of intentional government decisions. Rather, it is what the courts 
have called de facto segregation. De facto segregation does not constitute a 
cognizable constitutional injury because it is caused not by actions traceable 
to the state l5 but by the private acts of individuals who "choose" to live in a 
segregated neighborhood or to send their children to a segregated school. I6 
In the years immediately following Brown v. Board of Education, we spoke 
of de facto segregation with the understanding that despite the absence of 
legal injury there was still an injury in fact, an injury we could see and 
measure, an injury caused by our private acts, a moral injury for which we 
were personally and collectively responsible. 
However, this lay understanding of de facto segregation has changed in 
recent years. We have come to think of de facto segregation not simply as 
the absence of judicially cognizable constitutional injury, but as the absence 
of any injury at all. If poor black children in Washington, D.C. are injured, 
it is not by their racial and economic isolation but by dysfunctional public. 
schools. Fifty years after Brown and Bolling v. Sharpe, the word 
"segregation" is rarely spoken in public policy discussions or private 
conversations. Almost no one talks about racism, stigma, or white flight or 
about what whites are running from and what they are taking with them. 
There is a great deal of talk about the disastrous state of our public 
schools-in think tanks, on editorial pages, and at dinner parties where the 
invited guests all send their children to private schools. The Washington 
Post sees a bloated bureaucracy, a corrupt teachers' union, incompetent 
13. Segregation in Washington, D.C. was declared unconstitutional in 1954. Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
14. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 512 (D.D.C. 1967), ajJ'd sub nom. Smuck v. 
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc). 
15. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973) ("[WJhere no statutory dual system 
has ever existed, plaintiffs must prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was 
brought about or maintained by intentional state action."). 
16. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,495 (1992) ("Where resegregation is a product 
not of state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications. It is beyond 
the authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract these kinds 
of continuous and massive demographic shifts."). But cf Keyes, 413 U.S. at 216 (opinion of 
Douglas, 1.) ("[TJhere is no constitutional difference between de jure and de/acto segregation, for 
each is the product of state actions or policies .... There is state action in the constitutional sense 
when public funds are dispersed by urban development agencies to build racial ghettoes .... 
When a State forces, aids, or abets, or helps create a racial 'neighborhood,' it is a travesty of 
justice to treat that neighborhood as sacrosanct in the sense that its creation is free from the taint 
of state action."). 
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school administrators, and ineffective school board members. 17 President 
Bush's No Child Left Behind Act requires "standards" and "assessment" to 
be sure "low-performing" schools are held "accountable."ls But no one 
talks about who has left whom behind. No one measures the enormous 
divestment in social and political capital that has accompanied white flight. 
No one holds accountable the parents who have fled to the manicured lawns 
of private schools. 
This silence on the subjects of race, racism, and segregation and their 
relationship to the increasingly privatized view of education is the more 
complicated story that must be understood. It is a story of people of good 
will who are nonetheless responsible for the segregation of the public 
schools-white parents with black friends, colleagues, and neighbors who 
are afraid to send their children to public schools where most of the 
children are black, and middle-class black parents who are also afraid. 19 
These fears are related to race and racism, and they divert us from thinking 
about injury to the moral obligation of inclusion in community, the 
obligation that is the subject of Brown and the foundation of our 
democracy. 
This article continues a longstanding conversation I have had with John 
Ely about a subject central to both of our work. It asks questions that each 
of us has often asked and sought to answer. How should constitutional 
17. See Justin Blum, Mayor's School Plan Still Two Votes Short, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 
2004, at Bl (quoting Sheila Ford, principal of Horace Mann Elementary School, voicing her 
support for mayoral control of the school system ('''The system is so dysfunctional that I am 
speechless and embarrassed to admit that I am associated with DCPS. Nothing works! There is no 
leadership, vision, mission or competency."'»; Justin Blum, Union Chief Led by Quashing 
Dissent, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2003, at Bl (describing the misuse of union funds by former 
Washington Teachers' Union president Barbara Bullock); Doug Struck, Special Ed System Exacts 
a Price in Waste, Neglect, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1997, at Al (analyzing the dysfunction of the 
special education system, one of many problems facing a public school bureaucracy that was 
given "straight F's" the prior year by the D.C. fmancial control board). 
18. No Child Left Behind Act of200l, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 101,2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 
Stat.) 1425, 1439-40 (2002); see also GAIL L. SUNDERMAN & JIMMY KiM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., INSPIRING VISION, DISAPPOINTING RESULTS: FOUR STUDIES ON 
IMPLEMENTING THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT (2004). 
19. Throughout this article I use the term "white flight" to refer to the phenomenon of a 
substantial number of white families taking their children out of (or choosing never to enroll them 
in) urban public school systems where the majority of the children are black or Latino. A 
significant, but much smaller, group of upper-middle-class black parents leave the public schools 
and enroll their children in token numbers in predominantly white, private and suburban public 
schools. In the District of Columbia white flight is also a class phenomenon. White and black 
families who flee urban public schools must possess the financial resources required to send their 
children to private schools or move to suburban jurisdictions where the majority of children are 
white and upper middle class. The causes of white flight and middle-class black flight are not 
identical, but both are symptoms of the ideology and structural conditions produced by racism. 
While a detailed analysis of the complicated relationship between race and class in explaining 
white and middle-class black flight is beyond the scope of this article, I discuss the fears that 
motivate fleeing white and black parents in Part II. 
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theory account for the impact of racial prejudice on American democracy? 
In particular, how does racism affect the way we create community and 
make decisions about who we are and about the laws that govern our 
behavior? How should what we understand about our society's racism 
shape the meaning we give and the role we assign to the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
In Democracy and Distrust Ely makes questions of participation in the 
process of representative democracy the touchstone of his constitutional 
theory.2o The duty of democracy's decisionmakers to take into account the 
interests of all of those whom their decisions affect stands at the center of 
Ely's theory of representation reinforcement. This article explores how that 
duty is dishonored when racism-and a failure to talk honestly about 
race--excludes poor black and brown children from the circle of care that 
defines the scope of that duty. 
Part I of the article tells the story of two law professors and their early 
efforts to enlist their neighbors in the integration of the local urban public 
school. The narrative explores the virtues of race and class integration and 
of collective public conversation and action in pursuit of those goals. I seek 
to convey how hard it is for parents to talk with one another about race and 
racism. We experience these conversations as especially difficult because 
we feel a profound intimacy with our children that reinforces our 
predisposition to think of decisions about school choice as located in the 
private sphere. 
In Part II, I ask about the often unacknowledged fears that cause white 
and middle-class black parents to flee predominantly black urban schools. I 
suggest that these fears originate in cultural beliefs about blacks; in parents' 
accurate observations that less is given to and expected from children in 
segregated black schools; in parents' concerns that their children will be 
losers in a competitive, market-driven world; and in parents' experiences of 
loneliness and alienation in the responsibility of raising children. 
Part III considers two landmark constitutional cases, Brown v. Board of 
Education and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. I argue that Brown is best 
understood within the context of the nation's commitment to the common 
school as an institution that creates and defines community. When white 
parents abandon urban public schools, the segregated suburban and private 
schools their children attend replace the coIl1li1on school as a marker of 
community membership and, in excluding poor black and brown children, 
recreate the injury identified in Brown. These parents excuse themselves 
from Brown's moral obligation of inclusion by invoking the liberty 
20. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 
(1980). 
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announced in Pierce that makes the relationship between parent and child 
"private." I argue that to invoke this liberty in the service of race and class 
subordination distorts Pierce's meaning. My discussion of Brown and 
Pierce introduces my conversation with John Ely. I explore the divergent 
paths we take from our common understanding of the distorting influence 
of racial prejudice on democratic process. These different paths are 
determined by Ely's view of the Equal Protection Clause as a constitutional 
instrument for preserving democracy's process and my own view that the 
Equal Protection Clause announces a new substantive value of 
antisubordination. I argue that Ely fails to account for the significant 
process defect occasioned when the private decisions of fleeing parents are 
distorted by prejudice and when the taboo against talk about race and 
racism inhibits speech. 
Part IV tells the story of the District of Columbia Public School 
Board's decision to introduce a lottery for the purpose of deciding which 
parents may send their children to non-neighborhood public schools. I 
examine the tension between a view of equality that defines equal 
opportunity in terms of formal equal access to places in the best schools and 
one that focuses on encouraging race and class integration as a means of 
improving the health of the entire system by minimizing privileged parents' 
flight and maximizing the system's retention of race- and class-based social 
and political capital. 
Part V returns to my conversation with John Ely. Democracy and 
Distrust assumes that courts should be the primary interpreters of 
constitutional meaning and argues that judges should find that meaning in 
an authority external to the interpreter. This article argues that all of us are 
engaged in shaping and defining constitutional values and that when we 
focus only on judicial review we deny our own responsibility for the 
normative choices we make. The subject of our own responsibility for 
constitutional values becomes a forbidden conversation. 
I. A STORY ABOUT TRYING To TALK TO NEIGHBORS 
ABOUT SCHOOL INTEGRATION 
A. An Integrated Neighborhood, a Segregated School 
It is the summer of 1992. Mari Matsuda and I have come to 
Washington, D.C. to teach at Georgetown. We move into a lovely 1920s 
brick colonial house in a neighborhood called Shepherd Park. We love the 
quiet, tree-lined streets, the old houses and big yards. But what really sold 
us on the house was that this is perhaps the only truly integrated 
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neighborhood in the city. Shepherd Park is almost evenly divided between 
black and white families who live side by side throughout the 
neighborhood. In recent years a sprinkling of Latino and Asian families 
have come to the neighborhood, as have a few openly gay couples. Of 
course, this has not always been so. 
In 1920, when Boss Shepherd's huge country estate was divided into 
lots and the houses that still stand on our block were built, the deeds 
contained restrictive covenants forbidding sale to blacks or Jews.21 In the 
1940s, when those covenants were rendered judicially unenforceable/2 
many Jewish families moved to the neighborhood, as evidenced by the 
three large synagogues within walking distance of our house. In the late 
fifties and early sixties, blacks started moving to the neighborhood. Realtors 
sought to exploit whites' racial fear and turn a quick profit by 
"blockbusting"-buying cheap from whites with tales of declining property 
values that would come with black neighbors and selling dear to middle-
class blacks eager to own these fine houses where they could not live 
before?3 Happily, the blockbusters were not successful. The scheme that 
had worked so well in other places was foiled. Black and white lawyers, 
doctors, teachers, and businessmen organized and educated their neighbors 
to resist the blockbusters. They held potlucks, dances, and mass meetings. 
Their organization, Neighbors, Inc., still exists today.24 
Our story, however, does not end happily ever after. We discover that 
the neighborhood public school, an easy walk from home for our children, 
21. See CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND 
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 77, 94 (1959) (detailing how the local real estate board, the 
Washington Evening Star newspaper advertisement policy, and citizens' associations were "highly 
effective in maintaining racial residential segregation in the city," supported by decisions of the 
courts of the District upholding the validity and judicial enforcement of racially restrictive 
covenants for a period of twenty-five years); see also Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 F. 899 (D.C. Cir. 
1924) (upholding racially restrictive covenants in the District of Columbia as neither 
unconstitutional nor contrary to public policy). 
22. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (holding invalid the enforcement of racially 
restrictive covenants by the federal courts of the District of Columbia as a violation of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and contrary to public policy); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
23. See MARVIN CAPLAN, FARTHER ALONG: A CIVIL RIGHTS MEMOIR 151-78 (1999) 
(describing the practice of blockbusting in Washington, D.C. neighborhoods and the efforts of a 
. small group of citizens to thwart the speculators). 
24. Neighbors, Inc. was founded in 1958 to foster and maintain integrated neighborhoods. 
Neighbors, Inc., What Is Neighbors, Inc.? (July 7, 1960) (unpublished document, on file with 
author) (listing the organization's goals as "[c]ommunity stabilization through education toward 
elimination of prejudice and discrimination and lessening of neighborhood tensions" and 
"[c]ommunity improvement by combating deterioration and assuring the best in educational and 
recreational facilities"). Today, the group operates as an umbrella organization with other 
community groups in Northwest Washington focusing on beautification of libraries and schools. 
Telephone Interview with Rosemary Reed, President, Neighbors, Inc. (Feb. 25, 2004). See 
generally CAPLAN, supra note 23, at 161-78 (recounting Neighbors, Inc.'s origins and early years 
as described by the first president of the group). 
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does not reflect the neighborhood's demographics. In the 1970s, Shepherd 
Elementary was as fully integrated as the residential area surrounding it. 
Not surprisingly, given its active, educated, demanding parent body, it was 
one of the best elementary schools in the city, bar none. By 1992, when we 
arrived, it was essentially an all-black school. The white families in our 
neighborhood sent their children to private schools or used the school 
district's out-of-boundary process to enroll their children in elementary 
schools located in white neighborhoods on the other side of Rock Creek 
Park. Many of our black neighbors followed suit. 
The seats vacated by our fleeing neighbors were filled quickly with 
children from families who lived outside of Shepherd's geographic district. 
Ambitious black parents from middle-class, working-class, and poor 
neighborhoods used the out-of-boundary process to escape their own local 
public schools and give their children a better chance at a school with a 
reputation for good teachers and involved parents.25 Now almost eighty 
percent of the children in our neighborhood school live outside the 
neighborhood. Shepherd was at once the victim and beneficiary of a 
competitive system where parents felt they must use whatever economic 
and social capital they could muster to maximize the educational 
opportunities of their own children. While the doctors, lawyers, and 
professors in our neighborhood scrambled to find places at schools in 
wealthy white neighborhoods across the park, black teachers, bookkeepers, 
firefighters, and computer technicians dressed in their Sunday best for 
admissions interviews with the principal at Shepherd Elementary. 
B. A Dream and a Plan 
Our first child will not be born for another year and a half, but Marl and 
I know we want to send her to Shepherd Elementary. We chose this 
neighborhood because it was integrated. We want to raise our children in a 
community where they will learn the lessons our parents taught us-to 
value difference, to know firsthand the gifts that all people bring to the 
human enterprise, to understand the wrongs of racism and discrimination 
against the poor, and to experience the reward of working with others to set 
things right. Our neighbors have joined together to oppose the racist fear 
mongering of blockbusting and resist residential white flight. This seems a 
good place to start the work of reintegrating our neighborhood public 
school. 
25. See the discussion of the out-of-boundary process infra notes 91-93 and accompanying 
text. 
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During the next three years two babies arrive at our house. They grow 
more quickly than seems possible, and too soon they are in preschool, real 
people with their own personalities, gifts, and vulnerabilities. We are 
working parents, and, in the small spaces our busy lives allow, our 
conversation invariably turns to our children's future and to their future 
school. Somehow in the course of these cramped and often interrupted 
conversations we hatch a plan of sorts. We will find out everything we can 
about the school. We will meet and talk to our neighbors, especially those 
with small children. We will share our ideas, our ideals, the information we 
gather, our doubts, fears, and frustrations. We will find allies among our 
new neighbors, co-conspirators who share our belief in the importance of 
public schools and integration. If we can persuade enough families in this 
relatively privileged community to send their children to Shepherd, we can 
create a model integrated urban school where black and white children, 
middle-class, working-class, and poor children, will learn with and from 
one another, as will their families. If not the perfect school for our children, 
it will be a good enough one. Our neighborhood school will serve as an 
example to others of what too many people believe impossible. 
The challenges become apparent early on. On our own block there are 
three families with children of school age. None is enrolled in a public 
school. We learn that Shepherd has a popular prekindergarten program and 
some very good teachers in the early primary grades but that many parents 
move their children to other schools when they reach the third or fourth 
grade. One neighbor tells us that her son and daughter had attended 
Shepherd until one of the son's teachers suggested she move them to 
another school because they were bright, high-achieving children. 
As we talk to colleagues and friends it becomes apparent that middle-
class parents in every section of the city have given up on the public 
schools. The causes leading to the deterioration of the city's public schools 
are complex, but there is little doubt that the school district's reputation as a 
failing system is well earned. Each day we open our Washington Post to 
find reports of mismanagement, fire code violations, shootings, uncertified 
teachers, and appallingly low test scores. Congress has created a control 
board to replace the elected school board, and there have been three 
different school superintendents during the three years we have lived in 
D.C. Many parents do not distinguish between the conditions in their local 
school and those in the District as a whole. Others worry that even if they 
can find a good elementary school they will not be able to find a 
satisfactory middle or high school. In an increasingly tight market for seats 
in the best private schools, it makes sense to secure one of those seats now 
rather than take one's chances later. 
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Mari and I are firm in our decision to send our children to the local 
public school, but we are far from certain about that decision's wisdom. 
Like all parents, our dreams for our children are without limit. Liberal 
parents often say, "We just want our children to have options." Of course, 
this really means they want them to have a choice between Harvard, Yale, 
Swarthmore, and Juilliard. We are not immune from this parental disease of 
ambition for one's children. We understand the strength and intimacy of a 
parent's bond with his or her child. What parents want most in a school is a 
place where their child is safe and treasured, her talents recognized and 
nourished, where she loves to go to school and learns to think of herself as 
competent in that universe. And parents want a school where they, the 
parents, are listened to and taken seriously. All parents want this from their 
children's school, and privileged parents believe it is their entitlement. 
C. "Nobody's Business but My Own ": Talking with Friends and 
Neighbors and the Unspoken Subtext of Race 
Our eldest child is four. It is the spring before she will enter the 
prekindergarten class at Shepherd Elementary, and our neighborhood is 
ablaze with magnolia, dogwood, cherry, and azalea blossoms. We walk the 
neighborhood with flyers announcing a meeting of Shepherd Park Parents 
with Young Children (SPPYC). The meeting will be held at our home. The 
flyer invites neighbors for coffee, bagels, and a chance to meet and talk 
with other neighbors with young children. This is SPPYC's third coffee-
and-bagels event. Neighbors have organized and hosted the two previous 
gatherings. About two dozen families attended each. We collected phone 
numbers, addresses, and e-mail addresses. There was no stated agenda other 
than to provide neighbors with young children a chance to meet and talk 
about common concerns. Mari and I offered to host the third event. We plan 
to introduce the subject of our local public school and use this as an 
opportunity to recruit people to the cause. 
It feels good to be out in the neighborhood knocking on doors. 
Invariably people are friendly and open. But even at this early stage in our 
efforts I experience ambivalence as I approach my neighbors. I am certain 
of our purpose, and it is easy enough to express my own enthusiasm about 
the idea of neighbors coming together to make a common commitment to 
the school. Nevertheless, I find it more difficult to press other parents about 
their plans for their own children, particularly if they say that they have 
already decided not to send their child to Shepherd. One parent plans to sell 
his house and move to Maryland before his son reaches school age, and I 
hesitate to push further on the subject or even ask why. Something tells me 
that another parent's decision about where to send his children to school is 
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his own business and none of mine. I know how strongly Mari and I feel 
about our choices for our own children. Our first priorities are their 
happiness and welfare and teaching them values that we cherish. We would 
not gladly accept another's judgment in these matters. Yet how will parents 
and neighbors discover common values and identify collective 
responsibilities if conversation about how we raise our children is taboo? 
So we press the conversation with our neighbors as much as our 
discomfort will allow. And in our morning of leafleting we find several 
families who are still weighing their options, anxious for more information 
and a chance to talk with others in the same boat. We also discover several 
families with children already attending Shepherd. We like them 
immediately. They are upbeat, smart people with progressive politics and a 
sense of humor. 
We are pleased at the turnout for "Coffee and Bagels at the Matsuda-
Lawrences'." About forty adults and their children fill our first floor. When 
the time seems right, I call our guests into the dining room and ask 
everyone to introduce him- or herself and say why they have come. I lead 
off, explaining my goals in inviting them in a quite direct way. I tell them 
why we moved to this neighborhood and how much we love it. I tell them 
what I have learned about the school-that it was once a great school and is 
now a good one; that many of our neighbors have decided to send their 
children to private schools or public schools across the park; and that others 
have stayed, some of whom are here and can answer questions. I tell them 
that Mari and I are planning to send our children to Shepherd and hope we 
can encourage a whole bunch of them to join us. If enough of us keep our 
children in the public school we can make it a wonderful school again. The 
research on class-integrated schools shows that poorer children's scores 
will improve and that our kids will not suffer academically.26 Mari and I 
attended public schools that were hardly considered elite, and we have 
managed quite well in the academic world. We believe that the friendships 
we made in public school, across class and race divisions, and the social 
skills and values we learned are invaluable. My guess, I tell them, is that 
many of them had the same experience. Some heads are nodding, but I 
know that others are thinking, "That was then. Things are more competitive 
now." 
26. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS 
SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 41 (2001) (describing "'Coleman's Law,'" one of 
the central findings of James Coleman's 1966 report Equality of Educational Opportunity, which 
found that "blacks are twice as affected by school social environment as whites and that 
integration is 'asymmetric in its effects,' having 'its greatest effect on those from educationally 
deficient backgrounds,'" and noting that "[s]ubsequent studies have almost universally confirmed 
Coleman's findings regarding relative sensitivity"). 
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As other parents introduce themselves and say why they have come, 
they speak candidly of their concerns about teacher quality, class size, 
curriculum, the condition of the building, test scores, and what they've 
heard about how much better the schools are across the park. No one 
mentions race. No one asks, "Will my child be the only white kid in the 
class?" But a tall, attractive, dark-haired white woman with a New York 
accent raises her hand to say she wants to respond to all the questions about 
the school's low test scores and lack of academic competitiveness. She says 
that her children attend Shepherd. She tells us of a sister in New York City 
who is sending her daughter to one of the city's fanciest private schools, . 
and of her own daughter at Shepherd who is outperforming her New York 
cousin on every test. She never mentions race, but she is living evidence 
that white children and their parents can survive and even thrive in this 
nearly all-black school. 
SPPYC meets once or twice more. We support a drive to keep the local 
library open and talk about a proposed pocket park and the need for a stop 
sign on 14th Street, but we do not meet again as a group to discuss the 
school. Somehow this conversation, with its unspoken subtext of race and 
segregation, is difficult to broach in a public space. 
And even in more private spaces with friends it is not easy. That same 
spring, good friends who live close by tell us that in September they will 
send their son to a popular progressive private school that has recently 
relocated to a new campus in our neighborhood. Their son shared a play 
group with our daughter before either of them could walk. His mom grew 
up in the neighborhood and attended Shepherd when she was a child. Over 
dinner we parents often talked of racism, peace, and the trials and joys of 
raising our children. We also talked of Shepherd Elementary and our 
dreams for our local public school. They say they have decided that the 
progressive philosophy and teaching style of the private school are a better 
fit for their son, a free-spirited, nonconforming child. We know that they 
are right, that their son would feel like an outsider at Shepherd and that he 
would not find public school an easy place to be. This might well be the 
choice that we would make were we in his parents' shoes. But we are 
disappointed, nonetheless, I think as much in ourselves as in them. We 
never speak directly to these good white people about their choice, about 
how much race has affected their decision, or whether there is something 
we might have done together with other friends and neighbors that would 
have allowed them to make a different choice. This is about their child. It is 
a private space. 
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D. Who Said It Would Be Easy? 
September comes. We are sitting in the Shepherd auditorium. The room 
is packed. We watch as each class is called to the front to meet their 
teacher. Gorgeous children, every shade of brown, scrubbed and oiled and 
coifed and wearing their back-to-school finest, hug and kiss last goodbyes 
to parents, grandparents, and toddler siblings. Eight or ten pink faces, 
looking very much at home amid this sea of brown, greet old friends with 
the idiom and inflection of their black classmates. The five or six white 
parents in the crowded room appear almost as much at ease as their 
offspring, chatting and laughing with other adults and hugging their 
children's classmates. They are integration's veterans, white people 
inoculated against fear of blackness by crossing racial boundaries and 
making friends. 
There is not one white child in our daughter's prekindergarten class. 
Given our initial dreams we might well have been disappointed and 
discouraged. But what we feel most is excitement, a mixture of anxiety and 
expectant optimism. We discover that Shepherd is a lovely school, despite 
white flight, despite broken toilets; a leaky roof; and a crowded, noisy 
basement cafeteria. There is much in the culture and curriculum of this 
school and much in the bureaucracy of the system that we would change, 
and each day presents another challenge. But beyond the problems we have 
found wonderful, caring, creative, and sometimes brilliant teachers for our 
children, and the vibrant and diverse families at Shepherd have become our 
friends. 
II. WHAT ARE WE AFRAID OF?: THE UNSPOKEN RACIAL TEXT OF 
CONTEMPORARY WHITE AND UPPER-MIDDLE-CLASS BLACK FLIGHT 
A green and gold sign in front of the school reads, "Shepherd 
Elementary, A Jewel of a School." The glass-enclosed bulletin board below 
announces, "Open House, March 10, Welcome Parents." Twice a year the 
school invites parents to come to the school to visit classrooms while school 
is in session. The primary purpose of the open house is to give prospective 
parents a chance to see the school. Neighborhood parents come to the 
school for one last look before they make the ultimate decision about 
whether to send their children to private school or apply for an out-of-
boundary exception to attend a school in a white neighborhood across the 
park. Many black families from beyond Shepherd's geographic boundaries 
visit with hopes that they will win a place here for their child in the out-of-
boundary process. 
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Parents with children already attending Shepherd use the open house to 
check out our children's teachers for the coming year. But most of us know 
the teachers well. The school is small (two classes at each grade level from 
prekindergarten to sixth grade). The parent grapevine quickly spreads the 
word about gifted, caring, inspirational teachers and about the teacher who 
is mean spirited, burned out, or not very bright. We've seen which teachers 
give each girl and boy a goodbye hug at 3:15, which teachers will stop and 
stoop down to console the crying first-grade child or gently and firmly 
remind the sixth-grade boy to remove his hat. We know which teachers fill 
their classrooms with books, science projects, and art materials that the 
school district does not provide. We do not need to see the standardized test 
results to know which teacher expects every child to read and sees that each 
finds a way to meet her expectations. 
A gaggle of sixth graders greets me at the front door, four girls and 
three boys dressed in white blouses and shirts and dark skirts and slacks. 
"Hi, Dr. Lawrence," says a smiling girl, pushed toward me by her fellow 
greeters. She hands me a green flyer with a map of the school and the 
names of the teachers identified by the grade they teach and the room 
number of their classroom. "May I help you find your way to a classroom?" 
she asks, following the scripted greeting and smiling again to show that she 
knows I know my way around. I am pleased with and proud of these well-
groomed, well-coached, giggling greeters. Their genuine warmth and 
enthusiasm shines right through their manners, and I feel certain that they 
will make a good impression. If I were a new parent, I'd be thinking, "I 
want my child to go to school with kids like this." 
But as I walk away from them and turn the comer at the end of the hall, 
I realize that today I am looking at the school through a new parent's eyes. I 
am more worried than I want to admit about the school's appearance, about 
the slight smell of disinfectant in the hall, about the broken panes of glass 
replaced by yellowing plastic and the worn stairways. I am thinking about 
the white parent who may look at that beautiful bunch of sixth graders at 
the door and see only their blackness, that not one of them is white. I worry 
that even a black parent, a doctor or a law professor like me, will look at 
Shepherd and be fearful of sending his child here. I am on the lookout for 
these parents who look into classrooms with apprehensive eyes and wonder 
if their son or daughter will be safe in this place, if he or she will have 
friends, be cared for, and be treated like a budding genius. I want to meet 
them, to introduce myself, and reassure them that there is nothing here to be 
afraid of. Like those children at the front door, my dress, manners, and 
speech must counter the multitude of scary images of blackness that 
populate America's history and culture. I worry that I may not be up to the 
task. For I too know these fears. 
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A. The Fear of Blackness 
What are we afraid of? I begin with the fear that is hardest to face. It is 
difficult to speak about this fear because it requires us to think about racism 
in its crudest, most elemental form. If we fear for our child because most of 
the other children in her school are black, it is likely that this fear is caused, 
at least in part, by a fear of blackness. We have internalized a set of beliefs 
about African Americans that has its origins in racist ideology-that black 
people are lazy, dirty, savage, impulsive, oversexed, or any nurnber of other 
scary things.27 We are all frightened to some degree of things and people 
we do not know, but racism involves a particularly invidious form of fear of 
the other. None of us wants to think of himself as capable of this kind of 
thinking, much less admit that he would allow such thoughts to affect his 
behavior. Our natural inclination is to deny these beliefs and thus deny the 
fear ofblackness.28 
Our meetings of Shepherd Park Parents with Young Children were 
always well integrated, with at least as many white parents as black, and 
some interracial couples. White families easily introduced themselves and 
engaged in animated conversations with their newfound neighbors, black 
and white. At the school's open house there are far fewer white faces. I see 
only five white visitors as I visit classrooms. Two of them appear to have 
black spouses. I imagine these white parents thinking, "If I send my child 
here, he may well be the only white child in his class." Often when I speak 
with white parents about the possibility of sending their child to an urban 
public school they mention their concern for the child's safety.29 More often 
they say that while they would like their child to attend an integrated 
school, they do not think he would prosper where no other child looks like 
him. I wonder if they realize that for much of my childhood I was, more 
often than not, the only black child in my class. I am certain that my parents 
were also worried about my racial isolation, but when white parents express 
these concerns I sense that they are afraid, afraid not just for their child's 
27. See generally CATHERINE SILK & JOHN SILK, RACISM AND ANTI-RACISM IN AMERICAN 
POPULAR CULTURE: PORTRAYALS OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN FICTION AND FILM, at vii (1990); 
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can 
Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1261-75 (1992). 
28. I have argued previously that Americans "share a common historical and cultural heritage 
in which racism has played and still plays a dominant role .... To the extent that this cultural 
belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware 
of [or deny] our racism." Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987). 
29. See Jay Mathews, At Middle School Level, Private Versus Public Hits Home, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 26, 1998, at Bl (describing the choice confronting Linda and Dana Lawhorne, parents 
and longtime residents of Alexandria, Virginia, who reject being labeled as "middle-class white 
parents fleeing a multiracial urban environment" but are nonetheless considering a move to 
Fairfax because of their concern that their local Alexandria middle school is unsafe). 
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academic opportunities, but of the black children who would be his 
classmates and of those children's black parents. 
Here I should reiterate a point that I have made elsewhere at some 
length.30 I believe that we are all racists, that we share a common history 
and culture where racism has played and still plays a central role. This 
shared experience shapes ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach 
significance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings and 
opinions about nonwhites. None of us is exempt from the wages of 
America's racism. 
We also share a belief in and commitment to racial equality, and for the 
most part we are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways in 
which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the 
occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. As our culture has 
rejected racism as immoral and unproductive, hidden or unconscious 
prejudice has become the more prevalent form of racism.31 I have argued 
that we should think about racism as a disease rather than as a crime. Our 
conversations about why some of us feel we cannot send our children to 
black schools might be easier if we could admit these fears to ourselves and 
others without fear of judgment and condemnation. If we could talk about 
our fears of blackness we might find ways to confront and alleviate them. 
But these remain forbidden conversations.32 We cannot speak with friends 
and neighbors of their fear of blackness because we do not want to call 
them racists. 
B. The Fear of Having One's Children Treated like Black Children 
"I visited the school and looked in the girls' bathroom. The toilet seat 
was missing." One of our neighbors is explaining why she will not send her 
daughter to Shepherd Elementary and has instead entered the out-of-
boundary lottery in hopes of placing her in a school in a white 
neighborhood west of the park. She is a black professional, a community 
activist, and a leader in the fight to close down an open-air drug market 
down the street from her home. Her fear is not so much a fear of black 
children as it is the fear of having her children mistreated because of their 
30. Lawrence, supra note 28, at 322. 
31. /d.; see also Jody Annour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers 
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REv. 733 (1995); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII 
Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995). 
32. For a discussion of how our reluctance to talk about race and racism undermines 
antidiscrimination efforts, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: 
Learning To Think and Talk About Race, Again, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1995). 
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proximity to other black children who are being mistreated. She knows that 
because the children who attend the school are mostly black, it is not likely 
that the toilet seat will be replaced. It is likely that there will be fewer 
experienced and qualified teachers, fewer books, fewer computers, and 
fewer science and math labs.33 Chances are there will be no kiln to fire a 
child's clay pot, no violins and cellos to outfit an orchestra. But more than 
these material inequalities, she fears that the school system, the teachers, 
and even the parents will expect less of the children in this school than of 
the children in the school in the white neighborhood across the park. She 
fears that the teachers will expect her child to speak "black English,,34 and 
that they will assume she will learn to read slowly if at all.35 She worries the 
school will look for hyperactive boys and brace for sullen, sassy girls. At 
the open house the principal stressed "classroom management" and said 
nothing about creative teaching methods or programs for gifted children. 
She is afraid that on the first day of school, when her child's kindergarten 
teacher looks around the circle of bright, scrubbed faces, she will expect 
that most of the class will not go to college, rather than imagine that she is 
teaching a roomful of future doctors, lawyers, and CEOs. 
One of the products of racism and segregation is that poor black 
children are treated very differently than the children of highly educated 
white parents. Jean Anyon, Lisa Delpit, Ray Rist, and others have studied 
how teachers' attitudes toward poor, minority children reproduce the race 
and class stratification in American society. 36 In ethnographic studies, these 
33. See THE EDUC. TRUST, WHERE ARE WE Now?: KEy FACTS ON THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 
(2003), available at http://www2.edtrust.orgINRirdonlyres/14FB5D33-31EF-4A9C-B55F-
33184998BDD8/0Imasterach2003.ppt. This presentation catalogues indicators of the disparate 
treatment of minority students, including the fact that "poor and minority students have less access 
to high level curriculum," id. at 71, quality teachers, id. at 93, and funding, id. at 101. 
34. See, e.g., THE REAL EBONICS DEBATE: POWER, LANGUAGE, AND THE EDUCATION OF 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN CHILDREN, at xiii (Theresa Perry & Lisa Delpit eds., 1998) (presenting 
"background history that excavates the race and power dynamics surrounding the development" 
of Ebonics); Lisa Delpit, Ebonies and Culturally Responsive Instrnction, in RETHINKING SCHOOL 
REFORM: VIEWS FROM THE CLASSROOM 79, 87 (Linda Christensen & Stan Karp eds., 2003) 
(advocating that teachers use culturally responsive instruction to "provide access to the national 
'standard'" of Standard English while appreciating the language children speak). 
35. Ray Rist has observed that school administrators and faculty assume that middle-class 
children can learn and lower-class children cannot. Acting on assumptions made on the basis of 
children's skin color, dress, speech habits, and other cultural signals, educators create self-
fulfilling prophecies about the capabilities of students that contribute to the achievement gap 
between high- and low-income students. RAy C. RlST, THE URBAN SCHOOL: A FACTORY FOR 
FAILURE: A STUDY OF EDUCATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 18-21, 241-48 (1973). Rist argues that 
these expectations create an "ideology of failure" that permeates the school and the members of 
the school community. Id. at 62. 
36. Anyon conducted case studies in five schools serving different socioeconomic 
populations and found that "[s]chool experience ... differed qualitatively by social class." Jean 
Anyon, Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum o/Work, in TRANSFORMING URBAN EDUCATION 
253,273 (Joseph Kretovics & Edward J. Nussel eds., 1994); see also RlST, supra note 35; Delpit, 
supra note 34. 
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authors have observed the daily processes in schools and found that, based 
on race and class, educators make assumptions about the capabilities of 
their students that affect both subtle and overt interactions and expectations 
as well as the curricular, pedagogical, and pupil-evaluation practices they 
employ.37 
So my neighbor's fears are well founded if they reflect her knowledge 
of what most often happens in schools where there are a significant number 
of poor and working-class black children. But the conversation I want to 
have with her would not end here. I want to talk with her about Shepherd 
Elementary and the complex ways that her fears might be, at the same time, 
warranted and unwarranted. I want to tell her about the several skilled, 
inspired, creative, caring teachers who have taught our children here and 
who say that they have recognized and nurtured each of my children's 
unique genius. I want to speak candidly about the handful of teachers I 
would like to be rid of and admit that Mari and I have used our privilege to 
keep our children out of their classes. I want to tell her that when enough 
parents like her enroll their children at the school, the toilet seats, broken 
windows, and leaking roof will be fixed more quickly. We will insist that 
the school hire only highly skilled and creative teachers who expect much 
from our children and treat them with care and respect. We privileged 
parents with significant social capital need not comprise a majority to 
change the culture. Working-class and poor parents at Shepherd have 
shown that they too are ready to make demands. I want to be truthful about 
what worries me most-that many of us have been beaten down by the 
constant and unremitting message from the larger culture that says we 
should expect little from black children and from their teachers and parents. 
I worry that over time we will begin to internalize the message and give up 
fighting against it. (With each passing month and year we lose a little of our 
outrage at the unfixed toilet and the teacher who cannot make her subjects 
and verbs agree.) Weare fearful that we cannot win this battle for all 
children, and so we retreat in an effort to save our own. 
37. For example, Anyon observed that in a working-class school "work is following the steps 
of a procedure," Anyon, supra note 36, at 259, that is "appropriate preparation for future wage 
labor that is mechanical and routine," id. at 272, while in a middle-class school, "work is getting 
the right answer," id. at 262. In an affiuent professional school (where the parent population is 
predominantly professional), work is a "creative activity carried out independently. The students 
are continually asked to express and apply ideas and concepts." /d. at 264. In an executive elite 
school (where "the majority of the families belong to the capitalist class"), id. at 258, "[c]hildren 
are continually asked to reason through a problem[ and] to produce intellectual products that are 
both logically sound and of top academic quality," id. at 268. 
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C. The Fear That One's Child Will Not Fully Develop Her Gifts or Will 
Lose the Race for Privilege 
I began this article by describing an exchange with a colleague, a new 
parent who was already worrying about where his child would go to 
college. It is hard to imagine a parent who does not look at his child and 
imagine who he or she will be ten and twenty years from now. We watch 
their budding gifts: the way she draws a picture or solves a puzzle, his 
perfect pitch and poetry, her passion for musical theater and his for bridges, 
the way he makes the throw from third, her crossover dribble. We watch 
how quickly and joyfully they learn when they are toddlers on the 
playground, and we wonder if they will know teachers who will show them 
how to love Matisse, Romare Bearden, Puccini, Ellington, Whitman, 
Adrienne Rich, and the puzzles of microbiology and quantum physics. Our 
greatest fear is that no teacher will see the budding scientist, dancer, or 
CEO or that no teacher will have the skills, talent, experience, or passion to 
nurture and discipline these gifts. In a world where knowledge, teaching, 
and learning are increasingly commodified and stratified, where only those 
children whose parents can pay will touch a cello, read James Joyce, or see 
a cell divide beneath a microscope, we realize that we are in a cutthroat 
competition with other parents to secure the place in the preschool that 
promises the inside track to the Ivy League. We hear a colleague quietly 
boasting of a daughter admitted to Yale or Amherst, and we fear our child 
will be left out, that the promise of her gifts will go unrealized and that it 
will be our fault. We may disagree in principle with an education system 
that preserves class hierarchy, but if it's the only game in town and our 
children are at stake, it's just too scary to opt out. 
D. The Fear of Loneliness in the Hard Work of Raising Children 
They say it takes a village, but parents know that raising children in 
today's world is solitary work. Our own parents and siblings are as likely to 
live on the opposite side of the continent from us as they are to live across 
the street. Working parents hire nannies or leave their children with 
baby sitters and childcare centers. Our homes and apartments turn inward 
toward backyards and family rooms equipped with high-tech multimedia 
centers. We may remember playing on neighborhood streets and sidewalks 
with childhood friends or riding a bike to the local playground, but those 
streets no longer feel safe for our own children. 
When I speak of the loneliness of parenting I do not mean only that we 
are too often driving alone as we chauffeur children to soccer games and 
piano lessons. I am most concerned with the solitariness of our 
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decisionmaking about how we raise our children. When we choose a 
babysitter, a piano teacher, or a soccer league, when we decide whether our 
children will play with toy guns or how much TV they will watch, when we 
talk to them about drugs, war, racism, and sexuality, when we decide where 
they will go to school and ponder how that school should look and feel, we 
are too often alone. We may consult a friend or colleague, the Internet, or 
one of the burgeoning market of firms that for a fee will tell us the school 
where our child will fit best. But these are consultations in which we ask for 
information to place on our private list of pros and cons. We rarely speak to 
other parents about what we want for our children and what they need, 
about our values and how we can best convey those values to our children. 
We rarely ask for or offer help in this solitary task because there is an 
unwritten sign that says "private." 
This loneliness is heightened where parents want to resist the fears that 
cause white and middle-class black flight from urban schools. As each 
white or middle-class black family decides on its own to leave Shepherd 
Elementary, those of us who remain grow more fearful of being left alone. 
When there is no conversation about that fear of loneliness with those who 
leave and among those who are left behind, the fear increases because of 
the uncertainty about who will leave next and how rapid the exodus will be. 
The forbidden conversation isolates us from one another and makes the 
hard and solitary work of parenting more solitary still. 
III. UNDERSTANDING AND MISUNDERSTANDING BROWN AND PIERCE: 
ON COMMUNITY AND PRIVACY 
In our efforts to create an integrated school at Shepherd Elementary we 
encountered a dual challenge: to overcome the fear of blackness engendered 
by America's racism and to understand and empathize with the depth of 
intimacy between parents and their children. This Part asks whether Brown 
v. Board of Education's commitment to including all children in the 
community and Pierce v. Society of Sisters's protection offamily autonomy 
and intimacy can be reconciled in the context of school segregation and 
white flight. I consider the implications of Ely's "process defect" theory for 
meeting the challenge of this reconciliation. 
A. Brown v. Board of Education: A Case About Public Education and 
Community 
Brown v. Board of Education is a case about citizenship, community, 
and the special role that public education plays in defining and creating 
community. At the start of the opinion, the Court tells us that the plaintiffs, 
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Negro children, "seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the 
public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis.,,38 The Court's 
juxtaposition of "public schools" and "community" is not coincidental. Of 
course the plaintiffs' claim in Brown was about more than exclusion from 
schools. It was a claim for citizenship, a claim for belonging, for full 
membership in a community. But the plaintiffs chose public education as 
the beachhead for their attack. They understood, as ultimately did the Court, 
the peculiar relationship between the institutions a community creates to 
educate its children and the creation of community itself. 
A community creates common schools in recognition of the need to 
convey knowledge, culture, and skills to its children as well as to transmit 
values and create relationships. Schools create community because they 
take the private act of parental care and entrust it to the collective. 
Much of Chief Justice Warren's remarkably brief opinion in Brown is 
dedicated to a discussion of public education. The opinion considers public 
education's history as part of its discussion of whether the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended to outlaw segregation in public schools. 
The Court found that at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted 
the movement toward free common schools had not yet taken hold, noting 
that in the South, "[ e ]ducation of white children was largely in the hands of 
private groups," while "[e]ven in the North, the conditions of public 
education did not approximate those existing today.,,39 The Court then 
explained that it "must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the 
Nation.,,40 The Court's pronouncement on this question is central to its 
holding: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws 
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic 
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. 
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.41 
38. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,487 (I 954} (emphasis added). 
39. [d. at 490. In a footnote, the Court noted that "[c]ompulsory school attendance laws were 
not generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 
1918 that such laws were in force in all the states." [d. at 490 n.4. 
40. [d. at 492-93. 
41. [d. at 493. 
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Brown only makes sense in the context of this finding of a widespread 
commitment to public education. If the vast majority of white citizens-the 
people who mattered and were listened to in the community-did not 
support and rely on public schools to educate their own children, those 
schools would not have played this central role as a marker of community 
membership or citizenship. Today, when large numbers of privileged 
parents withdraw from urban public schools, they change or move this 
marker of community membership, and black children are once again 
excluded. 
The moral mandate of Brown is that all children in this country have a 
right to full membership in the community and to the community resources 
that membership brings. It cannot be that this moral mandate no longer 
holds simply because the walls that deny them access are built between 
poor black children in urban public schools and privileged white children in 
private schools and exclusive suburbs. 
Today we often think of the moral of Brown as about improving test 
scores for poor children rather than about integration. Vouchers, charter 
schools, Edison Schools, and the No Child Left Behind Act all offer 
educational reform for poor minority children with no direct attention to 
race or class integration. But equality of education cannot be achieved in 
segregated schools. This is not because black children must sit next to white 
children in order to learn.42 Schools must be integrated because segregated 
schools build a wall between poor black and brown children and those of us 
with privilege, influence, and power. The wall denies them access to the 
resources we command: social, political, and economic. Although the wall 
is not a physical structure or a prohibition mandated by law, it nonetheless 
permits and encourages us to hoard our wealth on one side while children 
on the other side are left with little. The genius of segregation as a tool of 
oppression is in the signal it sends to the oppressors-that their monopoly 
on resources is legitimate, that there is no need for sharing, no moral 
requirement of empathy and care. The children on the other side of the wall 
are not our own. They are not kin to us. They may not even belong to the 
same species. They are different from us in essential, unchangeable ways. 
42. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121-22 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]here is 
no reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded by members of their 
own race as when they are in an integrated environment."). But see John A. Powell, Living and 
Learning: Linking Housing and Education, in IN PURSUIT OF A DREAM DEFERRED: LINKING 
HOUSING AND EDUCATION POLICY 15, 17 (John A. Powell et al. eds., 2001) (stating that, counter 
to the critics who argue that "separation of the races may be the only means of creating adequate 
educational opportunities for poor, minority children," Brown's dictate that "separate is inherently 
unequal continues to ring true," and that "[a]n exploration of the educational conditions that 
children face within segregated schools and neighborhoods demonstrates that such a system does 
not serve the needs of students and the larger society"). 
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They do not belong to our community. This is the meaning of Brown's 
observation that segregation is inherently unequal.43 
Brown, then, is not only about access to resources; it is about the 
creation of community itself. The affirmative act of integration, the 
movement from dual to unitary, is required for the transformation from an 
established ideology and structure that excludes and demeans black and 
brown children to one that values and cares for them as members of the 
larger community.44 As the community's chosen instrument for the creation 
and nurture of mutual relationships and the transmission of values, culture, 
and knowledge, "public" education creates community and defines its 
bounds. The transformation of society envisioned by Brown cannot be 
achieved when the location of societal transformation is not held in public 
trust. 
B. Brown and Ely's Process-Defect Theory 
I have argued here that Brown finds segregated schools inherently 
unequal because they signal the exclusion of black children from the 
community of persons for whom democracy's decisionmakers feel 
attachment, empathy, concern, and a moral duty of care. Segregated schools 
were, and remain, part of a larger ubiquitously segregated culture that 
signals blacks' nonmembership and exclusion from participation in the 
democratic community of self-governors. Ely's explanation for why 
segregated schools violate the constitutional value of equality shares 
considerable common ground with my own. We both identify racism, or 
racial prejudice, as a lens that distorts, blinding us to overlapping interests, 
mutual benefits and burdens, and ultimately our common humanity.45 
But I differ from Ely in my understanding of why this distortion 
implicates the Constitution and in what I think the Constitution commands 
that we do about it. Ely's theory assumes that the democratic process 
functions quite well, for the most part. Racial classifications are worrisome 
43. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
44. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Race. Multiculturalism. and the Jurisprudence of 
Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REv. 819 (1995) (providing a transfonnational view of equal 
protection focusing on community rather than individual injustices). 
45. Ely's representation reinforcement theory explains when and why the democratic process 
fails, signaling the need for judicial intervention. Ely sees African Americans as the paradigmatic 
discrete and insular minority. Racial "prejudice is a lens that distorts reality," ELY, supra note 20, 
at 153, curtailing the political process by blinding us to overlapping interests and causing 
legislators to misapprehend the costs and benefits of legislation to groups whose welfare they 
value negatively, id. at 157. Strict scrutiny of suspect classifications is a justifiable exception to 
the general rule of judicial restraint because of the defects that prejudice causes in the legislative 
process. 
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for him because they raise SUSpICIOn about improper motive.46 Strict 
scrutiny is needed to ferret out legislation that distributes benefits and 
burdens because of hatred or disregard of those people who belong to a 
vilified minority. Although he recognizes that prejudice against blacks is 
widespread,47 he sees the process defect of racial prejudice as exceptional 
and aberrant. Racial prejudice is caused by bad actors who intentionally 
violate the community ideal of human equality. 
I view racial prejudice not as the acted-on belief of societal outliers but 
as a manifestation of the well-established and deeply entrenched 
community value of racism or white supremacy. Racism, once embraced 
and articulated in the Constitution and rejected with the passage of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, remains vital and 
ubiquitous. 
1. Unconscious Racism Revisited 
I first noted my agreement with Ely's insight about racism's distortion 
of democratic process in The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism.48 There I said I thought Ely's process-defect 
theory did fme as far as it went, but that in failing to take unconscious 
racism into account it had not gone far enough. 
Under present doctrine, the courts look for Ely's process defect only 
when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute or when 
self-conscious racial intent is proven under the Davis test.49 But the same 
process distortions will occur even when the racial prejudice is less 
apparent. Other groups may avoid coalition with blacks without being 
aware of their aversion to blacks or of their association of certain 
characteristics with blacks. "Likewise, the governmental decisionrnaker 
may be unaware that she has devalued the cost of [her decision to] a group 
with which she does not identify . . . . Indeed, because of her lack of 
empathy with the group, she may have never even thought of the cost at 
all."so 
46. See id. at 145. For Ely, the doctrine of suspect classifications "function[s] as a 
handmaiden of motivation analysis," id., wherein the heightened scrutiny required to uphold laws 
affecting a suspect class effectively '''flush[es] out'" laws motivated by "a simple desire to 
disadvantage the minority in question," id. at 146-47. 
47. See id. at 135. 
48. Lawrence, supra note 28, at 344-55. In that article I advanced the argument that courts 
ought to consider the effect of unconscious racism on government decisions when they interpret 
and apply the Equal Protection Clause. In part, I asked what wrong the Equal Protection Clause-
and more specifically the suspect classification doctrine-sought to address. I considered two 
theories that offered an answer to that question: the process-defect theory and the stigma theory. 
49. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239-48 (1976). 
50. Lawrence, supra note 28, at 347. 
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Ely was persuaded by my argument. He could fmd no fault in the logic 
that if conscious racial prejudice distorted legislative judgment, then 
unconscious racism was likely to produce the same distortion.51 However, 1 
am almost certain that he disagreed with me about what one should do with 
the implication of unconscious racism for his theory. The cultural meaning 
test, an interpretive method 1 proposed for identifying the presence of 
unconscious racism and triggering strict scrutiny,52 would require striking 
down a good deal more legislation than Ely would think appropriate.53 
Given his clear-eyed view of the continuing prevalence of racist beliefs 
among Americans, he was faced with a suggested augmentation of his 
theory that would cause the process-defect exception to swallow up his 
commitment to judicial restraint. Ultimately, Ely resolved this difficulty by 
ignoring it. 54 
When 1 ask about the fears that motivate white and middle-class black 
flight, 1 hear an unacknowledged subtext of race. White and middle-class 
black parents express concern for their children's safety, even in elementary 
schools where there is no real threat of violence. They worry about their 
children's discomfort with "being different," or that the curriculum is not 
well suited to their children's needs. They see leaky ceilings and broken 
toilets and think, "I cannot send my child to this school." They worry that if 
they do choose to send their children to this school, they will find 
themselves all alone, without a community of like-minded parents. These 
fears are real, and they are experienced as the rational reactions of caring 
51. I was a visiting professor at Stanford when I began writing Ego, and John Ely was the 
dean. He was one of the first colleagues to read an early draft of the piece, and I recall him saying, 
"Of course you are right about my theory, Chuck." I have found nothing in his later writing where 
he commits this to print. 
52. Lawrence, supra note 28, at 355. The cultural meaning test 
would evaluate governmental conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic message to which 
the culture attaches racial significance. The court would analyze governmental behavior 
much like a cultural anthropologist might: by considering evidence regarding the 
historical and social context in which the decision was made and effectuated. If the 
court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that a significant portion of the 
population thinks of the governmental action in racial terms, then it would presume that 
socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes made evident by the action's meaning had 
influenced the decisionmakers. As a result, it would apply heightened scrutiny. 
Id. at 356. 
53. For example, Ely probably agreed with the Court's application of the intent requirement 
to uphold a facially.neutral zoning law that disproportionately excluded African Americans in 
Vii/age of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hal/sing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
"There are many cities ... whose residents are predominantly or even exclusively white .... To 
require, in the absence of proof of intentional discrimination, that they somehow be more nearly 
'equalized' would be to take a step the Court has consistently refused .... " ELY, supra note 20, at 
140. 
54. I do not believe that Ely ever cited Ego or responded in print to the critique of his theory 
it contained. This is particularly notable given the prominence of his theory in my analysis and the 
fact that Ego is by far the most widely read and cited of my works. 
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parents. But they are also influenced by the distorting lens of prejudice, by 
irrational images and beliefs conceived and nurtured within a racist 
ideology and culture. The narratives in this article provide another setting to 
help us understand the impact of unconscious racism and to reiterate my 
original contention that Ely's process-defect theory must also include those 
cases in which prejudice operates outside of our awareness. 
2. The False Distinction Between Participation as Process and 
Participation as Substance 
Ely maintains that the Constitution is primarily concerned with process, 
or what he calls "participational themes." He reasons that while preserving 
liberty was a central intention of the Framers, the Constitution 
accomplishes this goal through its structure and provisions designed to 
ensure a fair decision process. He argues against judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution that identifies and freezes substantive values, saying that 
these values change over time and noting that a constitutional provision for 
amendment gives the citizens of a representative democracy the power to 
enshrine those values in the Constitution or to remove them. 55 Consistent 
with this core theme in his theory, he argues that the heightened judicial 
scrutiny of racism under the Equal Protection Clause is and ought to be 
based on process-a concern for fair access to democratic 
decisionmaking-rather than grounded in a substantive value. Ely makes 
clear that his justification is process based in the following passage: 
It is inconsistent with constitutional norms to select people for 
unusual deprivation on the basis of race, religion, or politics, or 
even simply because the official doing the choosing doesn't like 
them. When such a principle of selection has been employed, the 
system has malfunctioned: indeed we can accurately label such a 
selection a denial of due process. 56 
55. Ely contends that unelected judges are not in a position to detennine the substantive 
values embodied in the Constitution, because this practice would conflict with the democratic 
underpinnings of the Constitution itself. ELY, supra note 20, at 4-5. Moreover, the Constitution 
"recognizes the unacceptability of the claim that appointed and life-tenured judges are better 
reflectors of conventional values than elected representatives, devoting itself instead to policing 
the mechanisms by which the system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actually 
represent." Id. at 102. 
56. Id. at 137 (endnote omitted). In its pure fonn, the quest for procedural justice is utterly 
value-neutral in that it purports to separate rule application from questions of value. Tom Heller 
has noted that process theory "reflects the influence of liberal social theory which, for historical 
reasons, is committed to the positivist principle that it is not possible to philosophically compare 
the merits of competing nonnative propositions." Thomas C. Heller, The Importance of Normative 
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My own theoretical framework and the discussion in this article 
presume that the Reconstruction Amendments and the Equal Protection 
Clause embody a constitutional norm or value of anti subordination. 57 The 
meaning of this value can be understood only in the context of a culture, 
nation, and Constitution that for more than a century affirmatively 
embraced the values of slavery and white supremacy. 58 Thus, I believe the 
Equal Protection Clause does more than require that every individual have 
equal access to the democratic process and does more than grant blacks the 
right to treatment free of invidious racial motives. Rather, it creates a new 
substantive value of "nonslavery" and anti subordination to replace the old 
values of slavery and white supremacy. 59 Given the historical and cultural 
context of the Amendments' adoption, I believe the Constitution cannot be 
understood to establish these new values but not implement them. Such a 
reading renders the Amendments without substance. If the Reconstruction 
Amendments replace the constitutional value of slavery with the value of 
nons lavery, the Equal Protection Clause requires the disestablishment of the 
ideology, laws, practices, and structures that were put in place in service of 
Decisionmaking: The Limitations of Legal Economics as a Basis for a Liberal Jurisprudence-As 
Illustrated by the Regulation of Vacation Home Development, 1976 WIS. L. REv. 385, 388. 
57. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 
31 U.S.F. L. REv. 757, 775-78 (1997); Lawrence, supra note 28; Charles R. Lawrence III, If He 
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.1. 431 [hereinafter 
Lawrence, Hollers]; Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal 
Defense of Affirmative Action, 10 1 COLUM. L. REv. 928, 950-51, 962 (2001) [hereinafter 
Lawrence, Two Views]. Robin West has tenned this substantive understanding of equal protection 
"progressive," and has named me among a small group of scholars who she says embrace a 
"progressive constitutional faith." Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REv. 765, 
797, 796-97 (1992). 
58. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (amended 1868); id. art. I, § 9, cI. 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 
(repealed 1865); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, 555-59 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that while the Constitution mandates equality, "(t]he white race deems itself to be the 
dominant race in this country"); Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426-27 
(1856) ("[U]pon a full and careful consideration of the subject, the court is of opinion, that ... 
Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution of the United 
States .... "). 
59. Although Ely argues that the original Constitution was principally "dedicated to concerns 
of process and structure and not to the identification and preservation of specific substantive 
values," ELY, supra note 20, at 92, he lists slavery among the short list of values specifically 
protected. "[Sllavery must be counted a substantive value to which the original Constitution meant 
to extend unusual protection from the ordinary legislative process .... " [d. at 93. Ely notes that 
that value was reversed with the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments, which embodied 
a substantive judgment that human slavery is simply not morally tolerable. Thus at no 
point has the Constitution been neutral on this subject. Slavery was one of the few 
values the original document singled out for protection from the political branches; 
nonslavery is one of the few values it singles out for protection now. 
[d. at 98. 
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slavery and white supremacy. It requires a reconstruction of the substantive 
societal conditions that slavery created.60 
Ely rightly identifies the theme of participation as central to democracy 
and to the Constitution. The theme is reiterated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the text, history, and cultural context of that Amendment 
make it apparent that participation means more than process. The theme of 
participation also calls our attention to status, or standing to participate. 
While lawyers often think of issues of standing as procedural in nature, the 
question answered in the affirmative by the Fourteenth Amendment-"Do 
former slaves have standing to participate in the democratic 
conversation?,,-is clearly about status.61 It is a question of substantive law. 
It is a question that asks how we are constituted. Will these people who 
were formerly excluded from "We the People" now be included? It is a 
question that is answered with a commitment to a moral value. And that 
value is, in Ely's term, nonslavery. The value of nonslavery commits us to 
ending relationships of subordination and abuse of power, whether those 
relationships and that abuse involve the government or private exploitation 
and coercion. It commits us to the affirmative disestablishment of a society 
founded upon the maintenance of slavery and the dehumanization and 
inequality that slavery required. 
Ely's own discussion of the justification for the doctrine of suspect 
classifications illuminates how his process theory cannot be separated from 
the substantive value contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. Ely begins 
by noting that "special scrutiny," and "its demand for an essentially perfect 
fit, turns out to be a way of 'flushing out' unconstitutional motivation.,,62 
And what is that motive of which we are suspicious? In the case of "a law 
that classifies in racial terms to the disadvantage of a minority," it is the 
motivation "most naturally suggested by its terms, a simple desire to 
disadvantage the minority in question.,,63 More generally, we are suspicious 
of "attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake-to treat a group worse 
not in the service of some overriding social goal but largely for the sake of 
simply disadvantaging its members.,,64 Of course the disadvantages 
imposed on blacks by slavery were not "attempts to inflict inequality for its 
own sake" or motivated by a simple desire to disadvantage them. The laws 
and constitutional provisions that sustained and protected slavery were 
60. Elsewhere I have called this a "transformative theory" of equal rrotection and noted the 
distinction between liberal and trans formative approaches. See Lawrence, supra note 44, at 824-
25. 
61. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 201-39 (Collier Books rev. ed. 1965) 
(1951). 
62. ELY, supra note 20, at 146. 
63. Id. at 147. 
64. [d. at 153. 
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adopted to serve larger social goals, including maintaining a source of free 
labor to sustain the Southern agricultural economy and negotiating the 
compromise between free and slave states that was necessary to the creation 
of the Union itself. 65 These were rational, legitimate, and even overriding 
goals until the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments 
established the constitutional values of shared humanity, rights of 
participation, and anti subordination that rendered them insufficient 
justification. 
Ely offers an apparently purely process-based psychological 
explanation for the need to specially scrutinize we/they classifications. The 
legislator will misjudge the accuracy of generalizations that suggest the 
relative superiority of those groups to which he belongs. "'[T]he easiest 
idea to sell anyone is that he is better than someone else. ",66 Mistake is 
more likely because of the psychic need to feel superior. But would mistake 
invoke special scrutiny if the goal of nurturing the psychic need to feel 
superior did not conflict with the constitutional value of antisubordination? 
The laws that sent blacks and whites to separate drinking fountains and 
swimming pools had just this purpose. And while Brown speaks of psychic 
injury to Negro children,67 the flip side of this coin is segregation's 
illegitimate purpose of promoting psychic feelings of superiority in white 
children.68 Thus, Ely's process argument for ferreting out mistake is 
premised on the pnor substantive value of equal status and 
antisubordination. 
Ely sees the participatory process of representative democracy as the 
Constitution's mechanism for defining and protecting other constitutional 
values.69 He points to the Reconstruction Amendments as a chief example 
65. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 22-58 (1973); 
PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF 
JEFFERSON (2d ed. 2001); ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 58-68 (1998); 
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 97-101 (1980); Staughton Lynd, 
The Compromise of 1787,81 POL. SCI. Q. 225 (1966). 
66. ELY, supra note 20, at 158 (quoting GORDON w. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 
372 (1954». 
67. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,494n.11 (1954). 
[T]he policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of 
the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. 
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the 
educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of 
the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system. 
[d. at 494 (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
68. For example, as late as 1955 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld that state's 
antimiscegenation law, noting that it served the "State's legitimate purposes" of '''preserv[ing] the 
racial integrity of its citizens'" and "prevent[ing] 'the corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of 
citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride.'" Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,7 (1967) (quoting 
Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955». 
69. See ELY, supra note 20, at 88-10 I. 
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of the people's power to reconstitute themselves by repealing the value of 
slavery and authorizing the value of nons lavery. But it is not enough to give 
authority to this new value unless the authority requires the affirmative 
transformation of the beliefs, practices, and material structures that have 
buttressed the old value. The point of my first critique of Ely's theory was 
that unconscious racism is a vestige of the old value (slavery) that continues 
to distort the democratic process. Until the work of transformation from 
slavery to nons lavery is done there will always be process distortion; 
commitment to fair process means little unless we are also committed to the 
affirmative disestablishment of subordination.70 
C. Pierce v. Society of Sisters: The Limits of Liberty and Equality 
When parents decide to remove their children from troubled urban 
public schools, they do not think of themselves as engaging in white flight 
or participating in the creation of communities that exclude and demean 
blacks. As parents, we almost always act not because of enmity toward or 
disregard for others' children but because of deep love and concern for our 
own. The parent-child relationship is the most intimate of human 
interactions. Any parent who has nursed her infant, changed his baby's 
diaper, waited up at night for a teenager's return, or sat through a parent-
teacher conference knows this truth. The Supreme Court has held that our 
Constitution embodies a shared value or moral consensus that privileges 
this relationship and protects it from governmental interference. The 
government may not tell us how to raise our children or what we mayor 
may not teach them, unless it has some compelling justification such as 
protecting the children from neglect or abuse or ensuring the well-being of 
the larger community. 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters was one of the earliest cases to recognize 
this constitutional value.7l In Pierce, parochial and private schools brought 
suit to enjoin the enforcement of an Oregon statute that required all children 
to attend public school. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute on the 
ground that it "unreasonably interfere [ d] with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control."n The court held that the state could not "standardize its children 
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.,,73 Pierce 
70. Elsewhere 1 have described the difference between the process theorists' approach to 
racial equality and my own. See Lawrence, supra note 44, at 823-25. 
71. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
72. [d. at 534-35. 
73. [d. at 535. Some scholars have argued that Pierce is better understood as a First 
Amendment case. See Stephen Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 
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articulates a pOSltive constitutional value that is often read to justify 
parents' choices to leave troubled public schools as a moral and legal 
right.74 
The school choice movement has brought together a collection of 
unexpected bedfellows, including right-wing libertarians, liberal civil 
libertarians, religious fundamentalists, progressive alternative-school 
advocates, and home schoolers. All of these groups have looked to the 
holding in Pierce for legal and political arguments that parents have an 
inviolable right to choose the place and content of their children's 
schooling. For purposes of this discussion, however, I do not speak to the 
merits of applying Pierce in support of arguments for school choice. 
Rather, my intention here is to explore the shape and meaning of the moral 
value identified in Pierce-family intimacy and autonomy-to ask how 
that value shapes the way we think about integration, community, and our 
collective responsibility for children and to consider how we ought to 
weigh it in the context of our commitment to equality. Put most starkly, I 
want to ask whether, in a setting where parental school choice results in the 
hypersegregation of public schools, the liberty value from Pierce ought to 
trump the equality value from Brown, or vice versa. 
When I urge white and upper-middle-class black parents not to flee the 
"black" urban public school and argue that the value of equality expressed 
in Brown gives moral, if not legal, authority to that plea, I must be prepared 
to answer the often unspoken, but deeply felt, response from Pierce: "Isn't 
there an equally compelling value to democracy in the liberty to direct the 
education and upbringing of my own children, and aren't you asking me to 
give up that liberty?" My answer is, "No. I do not believe that my plea for 
your participation in fulfilling the promise of Brown compromises the 
'liberty' protected in Pierce." 
My answer comes from Critical Race Theory and from the larger body 
of antisubordination theory of which it is a part. 75 The moral value in 
protecting family intimacy and autonomy from the intrusion of the state 
46 HARV. EDUC. REv. 76 (1976); Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of 
Government ExpreSSion and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REv. 863, 888-91 (1979). 
74. See Charles R. Lawrence III, "Justice" or "Just Us ": Racism and the Role of Ideology, 
35 STAN. L. REv. 831, 841-42 (1983) (book review) (employing "strain theory" to show how a 
negative injury to blacks is turned into a positive right for fleeing whites). 
75. Critical Race Theory focuses on the persistence of conditions created by and traditionally 
associated with racist practice. As opposed to liberal theory, which promotes the equality of 
individuals through process, Critical Race Theory promotes substantive equality as the result of 
legislative and judicial action. By reflecting the perspective of the subordinated, Critical Race 
Theory articulates a theory of equality and human dignity that is grounded in antisubordination 
principles. See Lawrence, Two Views, supra note 57, at 950-51; see also Introduction to CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY: THE KEy WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xiii (Kimberh~ Crenshaw 
et al. eds., 1995). 
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 
2005] Forbidden Conversations 1387 
does not stand apart from questions of power and inequality or from the 
history that has created those inequities of power.76 When parents in D.C. 
flee broken public schools, we do so because our relative privilege allows 
us to and because we want to secure that privilege for our children. What if 
families earning enough to pay tuition at Sidwell Friends, Georgetown Day, 
or St. Albans were required to send their children to public school? What if 
we were required to send our children to a public school where at least 
thirty percent of the children were eligible for free or reduced-price school 
lunch? Would our liberty to "direct the upbringing and education of our 
children" be infringed in any real sense?77 
I do not suggest that there is something immoral in our desire to act 
always in our children's best interests. But would we really be denied the 
intimacy of family or the impulse to give our children what is best were we 
required to throw in our lot with our less fortunate neighbors-if ensuring 
the best education for our children required lending our muscle to the fight 
for the best schools for all children? 
Some will argue that I have it exactly backward. Rather than limit our 
freedom to choose, they say, we should extend that freedom to those who 
cannot afford the choice of private schools. If the public schools are failing, 
give poor children a voucher so that they too can choose a school that suits 
them. This argument purports to resolve the tension between liberty and 
equality by making the liberty of school choice a remedy for inequality. 
This solution seems attractive. It avoids having to directly confront the 
76. The Oregon legislation requiring children to attend public schools was passed in a 
particular historical and political context. The referendum campaign was organized and promoted 
primarily by the Ku Klux Klan and the Oregon Scottish Rite Masons as part of an effort to 
"Americanize" the schools. Anti-Catholicism was central to the proponents' campaign. The 
referendum was part of a nationwide assault on pluralism that included bans on the teaching of 
Darwinism, foreign languages, and offensive books and the institution of required teacher loyalty 
oaths. For an extended discussion of the Oregon experience, see David B. Tyack, The Perils of 
Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. REv. 74 (1968). The children 
attending the parochial schools the Oregon legislation sought to close were from poor immigrant 
families. The statute stigmatized them and excluded them from the community, albeit in the name 
of Americanization. One Klansman noted, "[Sjomehow these mongrel hordes must be 
Americanized; failing that, deportation is the only remedy." [d. at 79 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The immigrant families in Pierce probably chose parochial schools for religious reasons, 
but the effect of the statute was to defme them as outsiders and to teach their children that they 
were inferior. The Oregon statute's cultural meaning conveyed much the same message as that of 
the segregation statute struck down in Brown. 
77. I ask these questions for the rhetorical purpose of challenging privileged parents to 
reconsider their own decision to flee black urban schools as the exercise of "liberty" enunciated in 
Pierce. The answer to the ultimate question of whether Pierce can or ought to be read to justifY 
the exit of wealthy children from public schools is beyond the scope of this article. For a 
thoughtful discussion of the constitutional and policy arguments supporting compulsory public 
school attendance laws that would except only the few citizens whose religious beliefs required 
them to exit, see James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259 (1991) (reviewing 
JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990». 
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thus-far-unsolved problem of white America's resistance to racial 
integration and the conscious, unconscious, and structural racism of which 
it is a manifestation. And it is attractive too for poor black and brown 
families with children in failing public schools, because they understand 
from lived experience that no other solution will be offered. 
However, the solution of expanding choice to the poor is flawed in 
theory and fraudulent in practice. If the injury of segregation is achieved by 
symbolic defamation and material/structural exclusion of African 
Americans from the community of fully respected citizens that creates and 
is created by the common school, we can only remedy that injury by 
reforming the common school to directly address that symbolic defamation 
and material/structural exclusion. Offering choice in a segregated, largely 
unregulated market does not do this. In practice, the schools remain 
segregated and unequal, although there is no longer a constitutional 
violation because they are no longer run by the state. 
In early 2004, Congress created the first federally funded school 
voucher program by providing grants of up to $7500 for at least 1600 
students in Washington, D.C.78 But this $7500 voucher will not begin to 
pay the $20,000-plus tuition at Sidwell Friends, Georgetown Day, or the 
National Cathedral School, and nothing in the legislation requires or even 
encourages the city's elite schools to admit significant numbers of poor 
black children or prevents them from expelling such children if they prove 
troublesome. Most of these vouchers will be spent in Catholic schools that 
will continue to serve only poor black and brown children. The Bush 
Administration is enamored of vouchers and choice precisely because they 
can be dressed up as solutions offered out of concern for children who are 
left behind without any change in our beliefs about those children or any 
increase in the resources we make available to them. In practice, Pierce is 
used to perpetrate a cruel hoax. It justifies the white flight that mocks the 
dream of integration and is then offered to fulfill the promise of equality in 
Brown. 
1. The State Action Doctrine as Process Defect 
Ely argues that racism undermines the democratic process by excluding 
blacks from participation in democracy's pluralist bazaar, where groups 
identify overlapping interests and enter into mutually beneficial coalitions, 
or by causing legislators to misapprehend the costs and benefits of 
legislation for the excluded group. Racism causes whites, and even some 
78. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. C, tit. III, §§ 301-313, 
2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. (118 Stat.) 3,126-34 (DC School Choice Incentive Act of2003). 
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 
2005] Forbidden Conversations 1389 
blacks, to fear black people and shun them. Racism inhibits our ability to 
recognize shared interests, goals, and aspirations. 79 Racism cripples our 
capacity for empathy, for caring, for feelings of shared humanity with 
blacks. 
The process-distorting effects of racism that Ely says exclude blacks 
from participation in the democratic community are the very injuries Brown 
identifies. Brown teaches us that, in the case of public schools, these 
injuries are amplified because of the central role played by the common 
school in creating a community and defining its boundaries. Those injuries 
persist when those with influence and power in that community resegregate 
themselves through white flight and create new communities that exclude 
poor black children and their families. When schools in D.C. are allowed to 
deteriorate because white and middle-class black parents have fled, taking 
the social capital of their networks and the strength of their political voices 
with them, the government's failure to respond to poor black children's 
needs is the result of a defect in democracy caused by racism. When 
privileged parents read about violence, low test scores, crumbling buildings, 
overcrowded classrooms, and unqualified teachers in their city's schools 
and do not see those problems as their own, when we do not bother to come 
to the city council hearing on the school budget, when we can hear the news 
of a young person murdered in a school building and not tremble with fear 
and grief as if this were our own child, racism and segregation have blinded 
us to "overlapping interests"SO and caused us to misapprehend (ignore, 
discount, not care about) the costs to poor black children. 
But this defect in democracy does not take the form of legislation or 
other governmental action. Although the mayor, city council, and Congress 
are surely influenced by the failure of people with political clout to speak 
on behalf of poor black children, the segregation that has excluded them 
from the community of care is caused by our acts as private persons. Ely's 
theory advocates using process injury to alert courts to constitutionally 
suspicious legislation and justify heightened judicial scrutiny of suspect 
classifications. By default he incorporates the state action doctrine: No 
constitutional injury occurs unless the injury is caused by a government 
actor.SI But much of democracy's process takes place in the daily 
interactions among individual citizens. We engage in Madison's "political 
79. See ELY, supra note 20, at 153 ('''Race prejudice divides groups that have much in 
common (blacks and poor whites) and unites groups (white[s], rich and poor) that have little else 
in common than their antagonism for the racial minority.'" (quoting Frank I. Goodman, De Facto 
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275, 315 (1972))). 
80. Id. 
8!. Ely discusses the state action doctrine in the context of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 
(1969), and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
GROUND 275-78 (1996). 
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 
1390 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114: 1353 
bazaar" when we talk to our neighbors over dinner and back fences, at 
meetings of Shepherd Park Parents with Young Children, and at the 
school's open house. In this capacity as "private" citizens we discover our 
"overlapping interests" and our shared humanity. We come together as 
private persons and create community, and in so doing assume the public 
responsibility of mutual care and common commitment that is democracy. 
Or we run and hide from our poor black neighbors and say, "Those people 
are not us." We create communities that exclude them, and we fail to 
discover what we share. Surely if Ely's theory sees process and 
participation as the keys to protecting all other constitutional values, it 
cannot count as irrelevant or trivial the defects caused by de facto 
segregation and white flight. 82 
Moreover, an additional process defect occurs when we cease to 
experience white flight in racial terms, as behavior that violates the spirit 
and moral mandate of Brown, and rationalize it as the exercise of the 
constitutionally protected liberty of family autonomy and intimacy. As 
private racism is transformed into family privacy, we lose sight of the 
injury itself and are further blinded to our own role in its infliction or our 
responsibility for its redress.83 
Ely accepts the limitations of the state action doctrine despite the 
continuing harm that privately sponsored segregation does to poor black 
children and to the democratic process. He does not think it his role as 
constitutional theorist to challenge this firmly grounded constitutional 
principle.84 Instead, when his commitment to progressive politics makes 
ignoring the harm untenable, he must create an exception to85 or blur the 
distinction between public and private.86 
82. I have made a similar observation about the state action problem in a discussion of the 
constitutionality of the regulation of hate speech on university campuses. See Lawrence, Hollers, 
supra note 57, at 445-46. I argued that the stigmatizing symbolic speech of segregation held 
unconstitutional in Brown should not be transformed into constitutionally protected speech when 
it moves from the mouth of government to the mouths of private persons. See id. at 444-49. In the 
context of white flight, unconstitutional stigmatization and exclusion from community are 
transformed into the constitutionally protected liberty of family autonomy and intimacy by the 
transfer of the excluding stigmatizing act of segregation from the hands of the state into the hands 
of private parties. 
83. See id. at 445 ("[W]hen we decontextualize ... this privacy value ... , we ignore the way 
it operates in the real world. We do not ask ourselves, for example, .... who has the resources to 
send their children to private school or move to an exclusive suburb." (footnote omitted». 
84. West has called those theorists who believe the Constitution to be unassailable the 
"constitutionally faithful." ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 172 (1994). 
85. For example, Ely turns de facto segregation into de jure segregation by ignoring the 
act/omission distinction. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in 
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1292 (1970) ("A racially motivated decision not to alter 
attendance zone lines should trigger a judicial demand for an explanation as readily as a racially 
motivated decision to redraw them, though the proof problems are likely to be more substantiaL"). 
86. See WEST, supra note 84, at 174. 
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2. Forbidden Conversations as Process Defect 
Ely's theory assumes a free and robust exchange of ideas among 
democracy's participants. The First Amendment's prohibition of laws 
abridging freedom of speech clearly states the free speech value and does so 
with sufficient specificity to avoid the countermajoritarian perils of 
interpretivism.87 Ely names speech and the right to organize politically as 
among the rights of political access that courts should protect88 and 
observes that much of First Amendment jurisprudence concerns the role of 
political expression in the process of self-governance.89 
In the preceding pages, I have described how the subjects of race and 
racism have become taboo in our conversations about where and how we 
will educate our children. Of course the prohibition is not legislated. 
Instead, we restrict our own speech because we cannot bear admitting our 
own racism. We do not want to confront the inconsistency between our 
ideals and our beliefs. The taboo against talk of race serves the cause of our 
denial. And it impedes the democratic process not just by inhibiting speech, 
the primary vehicle for political discourse and human connection, but by 
censoring our speech's content. Thus, the process defect is compounded 
when our commitment to the ideal of racial equality combined with our 
continuing fear of blackness make the subjects of race and racism taboo. 
The participatory process is infected further still when the taboo against talk 
is explained not by its real origin, our reluctance to confront the fear of 
blackness, but by the positive liberty of privacy. In this way we are not just 
forbidden to speak about race but denied an understanding of the racial 
origins of the taboo. How can blacks and other minorities look to the 
process of self-governance for protection if we cannot talk about race and 
racism and if none of us will admit what we are not talking about? The 
taboo does more than chill expression generally. It chills speech on the 
subject of our racism, the very subject about which we must converse if we 
are to resolve the "American dilemma. ,,90 
87. ELY, supra note 20, at 13. For Ely, the Constitution's language falls along a broad 
"spectrum ranging from the relatively specific to the extremely open-textured." [d. Among the 
open-textured provisions of the Constitution are the Ninth Amendment, id. at 34-41, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection, id. at 30-33, and Due Process Clauses, id. at 14-21. It 
is the task of Ely's work to explain how the courts should interpret such "Delphic provisions" of 
the Constitution. ELY, supra note 81, at 6. The First Amendment, by contrast, is grounded in more 
specificity. ELY, supra note 20, at 13-14. 
88. See ELY, supra note 81, at 7. Among the primary protections afforded by the Constitution 
are "that the courts should protect rights of political access: the right to vote, to have one's vote 
counted equally, to run for office, to organize politically, to speak, and so forth." !d. 
89. See ELY, supra note 20, at 112. 
90. In a comprehensive and influential mid-twentieth-century study of American race 
relations, Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal referred to the contradiction between the unifying 
American dream of inclusion and the reality of America's racism as the "American dilemma." See 
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IV. THE LONELINESS OF THE LOTTERY AND ALTERNATIVES 
THAT ENCOURAGE COLLECTIVE ACTION 
I am sitting at a school board meeting. It is almost 10 p.m. We've been 
here since 6:30 p.m., as have many of the members of the public who have 
come to testify at a hearing on the administration's proposal to change the 
process by which parents seek to have their children assigned to a public 
school outside of the geographic subdistrict that has been designated as 
their place of residence. In D.C. this is called an out-of-boundary 
assignment.91 Out-of-boundary assignments have long served to stem the 
tide of white and middle-class black flight from deteriorating public school 
systems. Parents who are not pleased with their child's geographically 
assigned school, or who feel there is a better school for their child 
elsewhere in the District, may apply for admission to their preferred school. 
In a school system where there are many failing schools and a limited 
number of good ones, the process is very competitive. Last year in D.C. 
there were 7000 applications for only 800 available out-of-boundary seats. 
At the James F. Oyster Bilingual School, a particularly popular elementary 
school, dozens of parents stood in line outside for six days, braving the 
January cold in down parkas and sleeping bags for a chance at one of the 
fifteen open slots in the school's prekindergarten class.92 
Young white families in hip, up-and-coming neighborhoods in 
transition, where the schools have not improved as quickly as the 
neighborhood, are especially eager to take advantage of out-of-boundary 
assignments. Whether parents are simply seeking to avoid increasingly 
prohibitive private school tuitions or are genuinely committed to public 
schooling, the out-of-boundary process acts as an escape valve, allowing 
families who would otherwise leave the system to stay, and helps retain the 
tiny percentage of white students who keep the system nominally 
integrated. 
The administration has proposed a lottery. Under the new proposal each 
child seeking an out-of-boundary assignment will be assigned a number, 
and out-of-boundary exceptions will be granted according to where the 
child's number is selected in the lottery. 
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 
(1944). 
91. See Justin Blum, D.C. To Create Lottery for School Transfers, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 
2002, at Bl (describing a school board vote to replace the first-come-frrst-served approach used 
by parents who wanted to enro\1 their children in schools outside their neighborhood boundaries 
with a lottery system). 
92. See Justin Blum, Parents Camp Outfor Rare School Spots, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2001, 
at BI. 
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Under the old system, parents filed a separate application for each 
school where they sought admission for their children. Out-of-boundary 
exceptions were granted by the individual principals, nominally on a first-
come-first-served basis, until all vacant seats in the school were filled. In 
practice principals were given some discretion to deny admission if 
applicants had academic difficulties or discipline problems at previous 
schools or if, based on an interview with the student and his or her parents, 
they determined that the child would not fit in well at their school. 
Proponents of the new lottery have argued that the old system preferred 
children from the most privileged families. Highly educated, middle-class 
parents are often the most motivated and the best informed. They learn to 
work the system, creating networks, gathering lists of the best programs in 
the best schools, learning where there are vacancies to be filled and how to 
use sibling preferences, claims of hardship, or special qualifications to 
increase their children's chances of admission. They can more easily take 
time off from work to stand in line, and principals, whose evaluations tum 
largely on the results of schoolwide performance on standardized tests, look 
more favorably on the applications of educated families whose children are 
likely to raise their school's scores.93 
There are persuasive arguments for the equity of abandoning the old 
system. If I require proof of their descriptive accuracy, I need look no 
further than the roomful of parents who have come to testify at the hearing. 
With only a few exceptions they fit the profile of the highly educated, 
aggressive, middle-class parents who were favored under the old system. 
Most of them live in Capitol Hill, a neighborhood where the townhouses of 
members of Congress stand only blocks away from the projects, or in one 
of the exclusive white neighborhoods west of Rock Creek Park, or in 
Mount Pleasant or U Street, neighborhoods in transition where young white 
professionals are renovating lovely brownstones and brick colonials. They 
have come armed with multiple copies of written testimony and carefully 
prepared oral presentations, offering legislative and administrative history; 
data; analysis; proposed amendments and exceptions; and arguments for 
postponing, reconsidering, or doing further study of the administration's 
proposal. The proposals speak in neutral terms of efficiency, economy, 
safety, stability, settled expectations, and the best interests of children and 
93. DeNeen L. Brown, Fight To Enter Top Schools in D.C. Knows No Bounds, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 4, 1995, at B1 (describing the "desperate means" employed by some parents to try to get 
their children into their school of choice, including lying about where they live, begging elected 
officials for help, and becoming "salespeople, extolling to principals the benefits of having their 
high-achieving children and themselves-parents who are proving their willingness to get 
involved-at their schools"). 
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the school district, but each is designed to preserve the advantages these 
parents gained under the old system. 
My gut is growling-the excess acid in my stomach always a faithful 
barometer of my anger and anxiety. I resent the easy, unselfconscious air 
and expectation of privilege about these people, their polished presentations 
so different from those of the poor black and brown parents who come to 
tell the board of broken toilets, leaky roofs, crowded classrooms, and guns, 
in schools where these parents would not dare send their children. 
But I feel something more complicated than resentment. I feel empathy 
and admiration as well. I share these people's advantages, their expectation 
that public servants will respond to their wishes and provide for their 
children's needs. I know that they represent the tiny band of privileged 
parents who have cast their lot with the poor and working-class children of 
this city. These same parents have stood with us before the city council to 
fight for books, safe buildings, and better teachers for all of our children, 
not just their own. They've mounted letter-writing and e-mail campaigns, 
and they have held politicians and business leaders to account. I know we 
need these doctors, lawyers, professors, and executives who insist on being 
heard and expect that their phone calls will be returned. 
Already two of my African-American colleagues on the school board 
have voiced their impatience with the parents' proposals to revise the 
lottery. The whole point of the lottery, they say, is to give children from the 
poorest neighborhoods an equal shot at attending the best schools. 
Tommy Wells, a white board member, speaks up for his constituents 
from Capitol Hill. Wells is arguing for an amendment to the lottery 
proposal that would give preference to families who live close to, but not 
within the boundary of, three good schools (the "Capitol Hill Cluster") in 
their neighborhood. William Lockridge, an African-American board 
member who represents Wards Seven and Eight, the city's poorest 
neighborhoods, is livid. He cuts Wells off, saying he is tired of rich white 
parents lobbying for sibling preferences, academic admission criteria, and 
redrawing of school assignment boundaries at the expense of the children 
who are most in need. 
We have framed the debate as a contest between privileged white folks 
and poor black folks for a few seats in a handful of good schools. The 
lottery, it is argued, will promote the cause of equality because now each 
child will have the same chance as any other, regardless of the color of her 
skin or the wealth and education of his parents. If we all put our names into 
a hat (or a computer), each of us will have the same odds at getting a good 
education. This is the picture that formal equality paints. The promise of 
Brown becomes a chance in the lottery for a seat at a good school in a still-
segregated system. 
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Of course, the real world of historical, structural, psychologically 
internalized, unredressed racism and discrimination is much more 
complicated. An equal chance in the lottery for the castoff remnants of a 
school system that those with power and influence have labeled inferior and 
discarded does not achieve the substantive transfonnation of community 
envisioned in Brown. The school district will not provide transportation for 
the child from the poor Southeast neighborhood who wins the lottery for a 
seat in the rich white Northwest neighborhood. Nor will it provide a parent 
to ride the public buses and subways with him for an hour each morning 
and afternoon, or to come to PTA meetings and parent-teacher conferences, 
or to see that permission slips are returned, or to be his advocate, or to say, 
"Don't assume this child is slow just because he's black and poor," or to 
cheer at a class play or basketball game, or just to be there when she needs 
a hug. In fact, the children who most need a good school will not even 
make it to the lottery because that too requires a high-functioning, 
motivated, infonned parent. 
In the meantime, those of us whose financial resources and social 
capital give us access to school markets beyond the lottery will simply go 
elsewhere when our number is not drawn.94 And we will take valuable 
resources with us. The handful of good schools in the city have survived 
only because there remains a critical mass of parents who can bring these 
resources to them. We will lose not just those middle-class parents who are 
unsuccessful in the lottery. Other parents will decide that once these parents 
leave, their children's school will no longer be the school it once was, that 
they will no longer command the resources or demand the kind and quality 
of teaching and environment they require, or that the school will simply 
have become too black. This exodus of privileged parents will affect more 
than just the handful of schools sought after in the lottery. The entire system 
will lose these parents' voices, their networks, their political clout, their 
sense of entitlement, their claim on the public schools as their own, and 
their demand that those schools continue as the common school-the 
school that defines and is defined by the community of citizens. 
Ultimately the lottery, advanced in the name of equality, will perpetuate 
and reinforce the inequality held unconstitutional in Brown. It will further 
94. See Eugene L. Meyer, Love It or Leave It: ... Why I Decided To Go, WASH. POST, Apr. 
21, 1996, at C 1. The author describes his reluctant flight from the District and the reasons for it, 
including concern about schools for his two young children: 
!d. 
Ultimately, we were left with two in-town choices: admission into an out-of-
boundary (read: west of the park) school, by ingratiating ourselves with the principal, 
pulling political strings or somehow faking a reason (such as, it's more convenient to 
our jobs). The other choice was private school, a route I'd been before with my oldest 
son and was prepared to take again if necessary. 
But gradually, it dawned on me, there was a third choice. Move. 
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segregate our schools. But more than that, it encourages us to think of 
schooling as an enterprise we engage in as individuals, each gaming or 
paying for the best we can get for our own child. Instead, education should 
be a community enterprise engaged in for the good of the collective, for 
other people's children as well as our own. 
Are there alternatives to prevalent school reform policies that would 
foster collective action rather than private market competition and increase 
the opportunities for race and class integration in urban public schools? I 
think there are several interrelated and rather modest suggestions that would 
provide attractive incentives and opportunities to parents weighing their 
private concerns for their children against their commitment to the public 
value of shared care and responsibility for all children. Why not target 
urban neighborhoods in transition, where temporarily integrated 
neighborhoods might be stabilized by attractive magnet schools and 
mechanisms for local control by organized groups of neighbors? Within the 
existing lottery system, we could create incentives for integration and 
collective action by giving priority or advantage, in lottery and other school 
assignment systems, to race- and class-integrated groups of parents. If we 
permitted and even encouraged parents to work together with other parents 
to create their own communities across race and class lines, we would 
significantly ameliorate the fear of loneliness in the fight against 
segregation and the rush to the exit that occurs when white and middle-class 
black families see other families fleeing. Finally, we might look for ways to 
encourage individuals and institutions located outside the school system to 
create incentives for school integration. For example, universities, as part of 
their affirmative action programs and in pursuit of their goal of admitting 
students knowledgeable about and experienced in issues of diversity, might 
prefer both black and white students who had attended integrated schools.95 
Corporate employers might create incentives for middle-class employees 
who send their children to race- and class-integrated schools, or they might 
enter into public-private partnerships with urban public schools in which 
they provide financial and institutional support to create magnets that would 
be attractive to their employees. 
I return here to the theme of taboo talk and forbidden conversations. 
Throughout my account of the school board's consideration of the out-of-
boundary policy, I spoke of the subjects of race, racism, and white flight. 
But in the actual school board deliberations and testimony by parents and 
school administrators, there was almost no direct discussion of race, white 
flight, tipping points, or even whether we should encourage race or class 
95. See Lawrence, Two Views, supra note 57, at 934-35, 960-61 (describing the benefits of 
having students from diverse backgrounds). 
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integration through our school assignment policy. White parents talked 
about their concerns for finding schools with buildings, curricula, teachers, 
and test scores that met their expectations for their children's education, but 
not about what race and class mix they could tolerate in their children's 
school. School board members spoke of the need to give poor black 
students an equal chance to attend the schools of their choice, but they did 
not talk about whether we ought to seek to maximize race and class 
integration for either its moral or its educational benefits or ask whether the 
lottery was the best way to maximize integration. Certainly there was no 
talk of the fears of blackness I mentioned earlier in this article, of whether 
those fears might lie at the root of white and middle-class black flight, or of 
whether or not our school assignment policy should take those fears into 
account. These are hard, scary conversations in a society that, despite its 
moral commitment to the ideal of equality, is still deeply divided by race 
and class. But they are conversations that we must have if we are to truly 
engage in the transformation that is the promise of Brown. 
v. BEYOND A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw: 
WE ARE THE CONSTITUTION'S FRAMERS 
Ely's subtitle for Democracy and Distrust is A Theory of Judicial 
Review. He places courts at the center of his case, as do most constitutional 
theorists. Not only does Ely make judicial legitimacy the chief subject of 
his thesis, his argument is directed primarily to judges and to those who 
make arguments before them.96 Although Ely urges judicial restraint and 
deference to the substantive choices of the democratic process, he sees the 
work of constitutional interpretation as belonging ultimately to the courts. 
Judges must look either to the authority of constitutional structure and text 
or to the Framers' intent, rather than to their own values, to guide their 
decisions, and it is courts that must interpret the meaning of the 
Constitution's commands. Ely's own argument about constitutional 
meaning remains morally agnostic.97 I think he would argue that, at least in 
his role as constitutional theorist, his agnosticism is consistent with his 
position that it is the people, not the courts, who should choose values. 
In this article and elsewhere, I speak in a different voice than does John 
Ely. I mean not only that I choose personal narrative and argue from a 
96. I include here both lawyers who argue directly to judges and others who seek to influence 
judges through their scholarship. 
97. For example, even on the question of the value of slavery versus nonslavery, Ely looks to 
the text of the document and the choices made by the Framers before and after the adoption of the 
Reconstruction Amendments rather than make his own case about the morality of slavery and 
freedom. 
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subjective perspective, although those choices are vital to my purpose.98 My 
audience and my subject also differ from those selected by Ely and most 
traditional constitutional scholars. This article speaks directly to my 
neighbors, to other parents, to school board members, mayors, city council 
representatives, and members of Congress. I also speak to judges and 
lawyers and to the small circle of academic colleagues who may be my only 
readers. But I address those readers not as individuals with a special 
responsibility for constitutional interpretation but as citizens, as members of 
the constitutive community. And I speak to my audience about values, our 
values. My argument asks the reader who we are and (rather rhetorically) 
who we should be. I am not agnostic about slavery or Jim Crow or 
affirmative action. I speak of values as constitutional rather than personal 
because I am engaging in a conversation about public morality and the 
values we hold collectively as a community, about the way we choose to 
constitute ourselves as a people. 
Robin West has contrasted two very different ways of engaging in 
constitutional conversation and constructing constitutional theory.99 She 
names them the "authoritarian tradition" and the "normative tradition" in 
constitutional law. The authoritarian tradition inquires into "how we are 
authorized by a binding legal document-the historical Constitution-to 
constitute ourselves."lOo These are questions we ask not of ourselves but "of 
an authority, whether we perceive that authority to be the framers or the 
text."IOI "Here, constitutional questions are not moral questions at all. They 
are at best historical questions. The question is at root, What does the 
Constitution command?, not, How should we constitute ourselves?,,102 
Within the normative tradition, "constitutional questions concern the 
manner in which we as a society choose to constitute the individual self, the 
community, and the government. Constitutional questions, so understood, 
are clearly moral questions .... ,,103 West's authoritarian constitutional 
theorist asks, "How have we been told to behave?"; her normative 
constitutional theorist asks, "How should we behave?,,104 
Ely might well say that I have wrongly assigned his work to the 
authoritarian position. After all, he argues for judicial restraint in the 
interpretation of nonspecific provisions of the Constitution on the ground 
98. Elsewhere I have argued that a self-conscious commitment to a subjective perspective is 
critical to the work of scholars who toil at the margins of dominant legal discourse. See Charles R. 
Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 
2231,2251-70 (1992). 
99. See WEST, supra note 84, at 191-98. 
100. Id. at 193. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 192-93. 
104. Id. at 193. 
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that the substantive moral values contained in the Constitution ought to be 
the product of the people's moral deliberation and decision. lOS The text of 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments surely answers the 
Reconstruction nation's question, "How should we behave?" But here, as 
West points out, the contemporary interpretive task is still undertaken by 
reference to historical authority. It is a question about nineteenth-century 
morality, not our own. 
I choose the normative tradition for the same reason that I walked my 
neighborhood in Shepherd Park seeking potential public school parents and 
pushed my colleagues on the school board to talk openly about white flight 
and the causes, real and imagined, of white and middle-class black fear. I 
want to talk with my neighbors about our values, not those of the nation's 
Founders or the Americans who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. I want 
to ask how we should behave because I want us to take responsibility for 
our behavior. I do not place the legitimacy of judicial review at the center 
of this conversation, because to do so presumes the courts' role as primary 
and ultimate interpreter of constitutional meaning and places the source or 
authority for that meaning beyond our control. To give to courts exclusive 
or principal responsibility for constitutional interpretation encourages us to 
view the choice of values as beyond our own control. 106 
This article describes a world of segregated schools where the white 
and middle-class black families who have fled from urban schools and left 
poor black children behind do not see themselves as in any way responsible 
for the isolation, stigma, and diminished resources that mark those 
segregated schools and children. Having held segregated schools inherently 
unequal and violative of the constitutional value of nonslavery, the courts 
reviewed this behavior of white flight and pronounced it exempt from 
constitutional scrutiny.107 There was no state action in these parental 
choices to move to all-white neighborhoods and private schools and 
105. A majority can, however, choose to bind its successors to a set of values by enshrining 
them in the Constitution through the amendment process. The Reconstruction Amendments were 
the result of such an attempt. ELY, supra note 20, at 33. 
106. Paul Brest calls the principle of judicial exclusivity "deeply flawed." Paul Brest, The 
Thirty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 
175, 175 (1986); see also WEST, supra note 84, at 190 ("The flaw is that we have delegated to the 
courts, rather than kept for ourselves, the moral responsibility for our decisions. By protecting, 
cherishing, and relying on judicial review, we have essentially alienated our moral public lives to 
the courts. "). 
107. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992) ("Where resegregation is a product not 
of state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional implications."). Compare 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 17-18 (1971) (defining de facto 
segregation as those situations in which a "racial imbalance exists in the schools but with no 
showing that this was brought about by discriminatory action of state authorities"), with Keyes v. 
Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189,208 (1973) (defining de jure segregation as requiring "purpose or 
intent to segregate"). 
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therefore no violation of the constitutional value of equality. If the 
Constitution defines our public morality, and we cede to the courts its 
interpretation, we need not worry about examining our own values and 
conscience. The courts have found those who flee faultless. The authority 
has spoken. Moreover, the courts have given positive moral value to our 
choice. 108 Our decision to flee the soon-to-be-black public school is not 
immoral segregation at all, state sponsored or otherwise. It is the highly 
moral act of nurturing one's own child, of preserving family and protecting 
its autonomy from an overreaching state. 
Judicial review and the authoritarian tradition help us hide from our 
own values, from confronting the question of what we should do, from 
coming face to face to ask questions of each other and answer them 
together, from bearing the responsibility for our answers. Judicial review 
helps us avoid the forbidden conversation. In this way judicial review itself 
becomes a process defect, subverting the democratic conversation about 
race. I choose the normative tradition to break the taboo. We must talk with 
one another about our public morality and the way we constitute ourselves. 
We must take responsibility for our behavior. 
I embrace the normative constitutional conversation because it forces us 
to take sides. When we look to an external authority to tell us what is right 
and good, the moral choice is too easily portrayed as neutral or shared. A 
. normative constitutional conversation unmasks dominant ideology and 
doctrine that parade in the clothing of shared values and neutral 
principles. 109 In a 1992 article on critical race scholarship, pedagogy, and 
politics, I urged progressive scholars of color to embrace non-neutrality. 1 10 I 
argued that progressive theorists, teachers, and activists must "evaluate 
work product (judicial opinions, legislation, organizing tactics, ideas, 
theory, poetry) according to the degree to which the effort serves the cause 
of liberation. ,,111 I said this was particularly important to the scholar 
engaged in constitutional discourse where "the dominant legal ideology of 
108. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
109. See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, 
Rationalization, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 70 
(Derrick Bell ed., 1980); Lawrence, Two Views, supra note 57; Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS 144 (Robert K. Fullinwider & Claudia Millseds., 1986). 
110. See Lawrence, supra note 98, at 2259-64. In that piece, I argued, 
Embracing instrumentalism, like owning one's perspective, serves a dual 
liberatory purpose. By keeping our politics at the forefront and measuring our work and 
that of others by the bottom line of results, we can be certain that theory is disciplined 
by purpose and guided by the needs and resulting insight of those for whom change is 
most urgent. 
[d. at 2259-60. 
Ill. [d. at 2259. 
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equal opportunity employs the rhetoric of antidiscrimination and equal 
treatment to disguise the clash in values between those who are burdened 
by . . . discriminatory conditions and those who are responsible for and 
benefit from those conditions.,,112 When I talk with fellow citizens about 
our values (mine and theirs) and I am unambiguous about where I stand, 
those clashes become apparent. More important for the project of 
integration and progressive antiracist politics, we will also know, or 
discover in the course of candid conversation, when our values are truly 
shared. 
When we make constitutional arguments only to courts or to those who 
belong to the elite debating society that is trained in the language and ritual 
of the law, we engage in a conversation among those who are politically 
dominant while excluding the ideas and voices of subordinated peoples. 
Mari Matsuda has urged a jurisprudential inquiry and method that 
deliberately chooses to see the world from the standpoint of the 
oppressed. I 13 Engaging laypersons from the communities where we live and 
work in constitutional conversation makes more room for voices from the 
bottom, whose experience in urban segregated schools challenges the 
"neutral principles" embodied in the state action doctrine and in Pierce's 
right to a private segregated education for children from privileged families. 
As a progressive black scholar who writes from the margins of legal 
discourse, I cannot be content to accept that marginal location. It will not do 
for me to gain a more central place in that discourse by sacrificing the 
liberating content of my message, framing my argument to fit the borders of 
conventional form, or addressing my case only to those to whom we have 
given authority. I move the constitutional conversation beyond judicial 
review because I believe it my primary task and obligation to open 
constitutional discourse and make it more inclusive. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has employed the lens of my own personal experience as a 
neighbor, parent, school board member, citizen, and constitutional scholar 
to consider how the flight of white and middle-class black parents from 
urban public schools-and the fears that motivate that flight-subvert the 
principle of equal citizenship enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education 
112. [d. at 2260. 
113. See MARl J. MATSUDA, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudential Method, in WHERE Is YOUR BODY?: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE, GENDER, 
AND THE LAW 3 (1996) (directing lawyers to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed 
and to maintain multiple consciousness as a way of transferring the details of their own special 
knowledge to the standard jurisprudential discourse). 
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and undennine the democratic process by inhibiting honest conversation 
about race and racism. I have argued that Brown identifies the American 
public school as a critical site for understanding and shaping the meaning of 
equality. Brown assigns the public school this central place not only 
because it was public schools that inflicted on black children the psychic 
injury of a "feeling of inferiority,,,114 or because schools were the "principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values[ and] preparing him for 
later professional training,,,115 but also because the public school was a 
chief instrument for the creation and defmition of the community of fully 
valued citizens. I have argued here that when white and middle-class black 
parents flee predominantly black urban public schools, they recreate the 
constitutional injury of exclusion from community and empathetic regard 
identified in Brown. 
I have observed that the racial fear that motivates white and middle-
class black flight, and our reluctance to acknowledge that fear, causes us to 
avoid the conversations that might cast light on the prejudicial origins of 
our decisions to abandon black urban schools. This taboo against candid 
conversation about the causes of white flight is reinforced by the intense 
intimacy and privacy that parents experience in relation to their children. 
When parents rationalize and explain the taboo against talk about race and 
racism in the race-neutral language of familial intimacy and privacy, we 
avoid asking ourselves the hard question of whether racism has influenced 
white flight. When fear of confronting our racism causes less speech, the 
constitutional values of both equality and free speech are implicated. 
These two values reside at the center of John Ely's theory of 
representation reinforcement and of Democracy and Distrust, a book 
grounded in democratic political theory. Judicial review functions to 
enhance democracy by responding to malfunctions in the representative 
system that "chok[e] off the channels of political change.,,116 These 
channels carry the commerce of speech, empathy, the recognition of 
commonalities of interest, and shared humanity. There is also a related, but 
distinct, theory of prejudice at the heart of Ely's book. The channels that 
carry speech, empathy, and recognition of common interest are choked off 
most often by fear and loathing of those who are viewed in some 
fundamental way as "other." When we forbid or avoid conversations about 
race and racism, Ely's insights about democracy and prejudice are 
powerfully implicated. I have endeavored in this article to explore some of 
those implications. 
114. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 u.s. 483,494 (1954). 
115. [d. at 493. 
116. ELY, supra note 20, at 103. 
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John Ely was a shy man. When we were both on the faculty of Stanford 
Law School, he never wandered aimlessly into my office to chat. But when 
I went to his office, bringing a hard conversation with me, he was not afraid 
of me or of the difficult subject of our shared racism. He was rare in this 
regard, and I respected him as much for this fearlessness as for his great 
intellect. John Ely was dean of the law school when I came to Stanford, and 
I know that he was influential in the law school's decision to hire me. I 
believe that John hired me because he knew that I would insist that my 
students and my colleagues· engage in forbidden conversations and break 
the taboos that choke off the channels of liberation and change. I think he 
would be pleased that I have used this Symposium to continue the job he 
handed me. 
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